Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina by Brandis, Henry, Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 25 | Number 1 Article 4
12-1-1946
Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North
Carolina
Henry Brandis Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henry Brandis Jr., Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1946).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol25/iss1/4
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES AND
CAUSES IN NORTH CAROLINA
HENRY BRANDIS, JR.*
I. JOINDER OF PARTIES
The basic North Carolina statutory provisions on joinder of parties
are G. S. 1-68 through 1-73.1
Under G. S. 1-68 "All persons having an interest in the subject of
the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be joined as plain-
tiffs, either jointly, severally, or in the alternative, except as otherwise
provided." Under G. S. 1-69 "All persons may be made defendants,
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, who have, or claim, an interest
in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff, or who are necessary parties
to a complete determination or settlement of the question involved."
It is provided in G. S. 1-70 that those united in interest "must" be
joined as plaintiffs or defendants; though if one who should be a plain-
tiff will not join as such, he may be made a defendant, the reason there-
for being stated in the complaint. The "must" in this section is modified
materially as to parties defendant by G. S. 1-72, which provides: "In all
cases of joint contracts of partners in trade or others, suit may be
brought and prosecuted against all or any number of the persons mak-
ing such contracts." And G. S. 1-71 expressly gives the plaintiff an
option to join defendants severally liable "upon the same obligation.
' 2
The power to bring in new parties is provided by G. S. 1-73.3
These provisions, standing alone, have given no undue trouble. Since
there is no provision regarding plaintiffs united in interest comparable
to that regarding defendants in G. S. 1-72, when the Court regards the
right to be enforced as indivisible, all those sharing it must be joined as
plaintiffs.4 However, this article is concerned with permissive, rather
than mandatory joinder.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
I See also N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-113 through §1-115, dealing with the
prosecution of actions against joint and several debtors.
'In Castleberry v. Sasser, 210 N. C. 576, 187 S. E. 761 (1936), this enabled
one of the original defendants, who was appointed administrator and substituted
for deceased plaintiff, to take a nonsuit against himself individually and proceed
against the other defendants.
' See also N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-163. Discussion of the subject of bring-
ing in new parties is beyond the scope of this article.
'Fishell v. Evans, 193 N. C. 660, 137 S. E. 865 (1927) (joint payees of note
must join in suit on note) ; Allen v. McMillan, 191 N. C. 517, 132 S. E. 276 (1926)
(joint owners or cotenants of personal property must-join in action for posses-
sion) ; Winders v. Hill, 141 N. C. 694, 54 S. E. 440 (1906) (members of syndicate
making land contract must all be parties plaintiff); Proctor v. Georgia Home
Insurance Co., 124 N. C. 265, 32 S. E. 716 (1899) (when an iniurance policy is pay-
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PARTIES PLAINTIFF
It is clear that even though the rights of plaintiffs are several, at
least for some purposes, they may join when they seek the same type
of relief with respect to property in which each has an interest. Thus,
for instance, it is proper for the owner of an easement and the owner
of the fee to join in an action against a trespasser for damages and an
injunction.5 The same type of approach is reflected in the personal
property field in a case where a truck was sold under a conditional sale
contract and the Court permitted conditional vendor and vendea to join
in an action against one whose negligence damaged the truck.0 This
was allowed though the vendee was claiming damages not only for di-
rect injury to the truck but also for lost profits.
On the other hand the unifying factor of the shared property is
missing where several plaintiffs join to recover for their respective
personal injuries; and this (more fully discussed subsequently) is
branded not only a misjoinder of parties, but misjoinder of causes as
well.7
PARTIES DEFENDANT
The provisions of G. S. 1-71 and 1-72, set forth above, obviously
give a plaintiff much leeway in joining multiple defendants in actions
founded on contract, whether their liability is joint, joint and several,
or several. Thus, for example, it is proper to join a principal and his
sureties in suing on a claim for which both are liable,8 even though
recovery against the surety may, by his contract, be limited to a smaller
sum than the recovery sought against the principal.9 If the same is not
able to two persons "as their interest may appear," both must be plaintiffs). See
also Neal v. Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., 224 N. C. 103, 29 S. E. (2d) 206
(1944) ; Redmon v. Netherlands Fire Ins. Co., 184 N. C. 481, 114 S. E. 758 (1922).
'Morganton v. Hudson, 207 N. C. 360, 177 S. E. 169 (1934). Judge Brogden
said, at page 362: "An easement is an interest in land, and it has been held by
this Court that a tenant and an owner may be properly joined in an action for
trespass or remainderman and life tenant."
'Wilson v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 207 N. C. 263, 176 S. E. 750 (1934).
The opinion indicates the Court thought two causes of action were involved, not
a mere joinder of parties. This aspect of the case is subsequently discussed.
Where a statute provides a penalty for the benefit of anyone suing fdr it, two
plaintiffs can apparently give themselves a joint interest in the recovery, and thus
justify their joinder, by the act of joining. See Carter v. Wilmington & Weldon
R. IL. 125 N. C. 437, 36 S. E. 14 (1900).
'Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N. C. 97, 65 S. E. 750 (1909). See also
Campbell v. Washington Light and Power Co., 166 N. C. 488, 82 S. E. 842 (1914).
'Watsbn v. King, 200 N. C. 8, 156 S. E. 93 (1930); Harrison v. Southern
Transit Corp., 192 N. C. 545, 135 S. E. 460 (1926); Pritchard v. Mitchell, 1'39
N. C. 54, 51 S. E. 783 (1905). See, however, cases cited infra notes 176 and 177.9 Virginia Trust Co. v. Pharr Estates, Inc., 206 N. C. 894, 175 S. E. 186 (1934)
(some defendants had guaranteed payment when due of both principal and interest,
but one had guaranteed interest and taxes only) ; Shuford v. Yarbrough, 197 N. C.
150, 147 S. E. 824 (1929) ; McCall v. Zachary, 131 N. C. 466, 42 S. E. 903 (1902).
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true of indemnitors or some guarantors, it is because they have no
liability to plaintiff, at least at the time the principal is being sued. °
Other examples of proper joinder are suits against the maker, payee
and indorsers of a note, hand suits against several warrantors in a chain
of title.
12
The provisions of G. S. 1-71 and 1-72 are not broad enough, in
terms, to cover an action brought against several defendants in tort.m
However, the Court has clearly recognized the right to join defendants
in tort if the allegations show them to be joint tort feasors. 14 The rule
covers not only cases of tort feasors entitled to contribution as between
themselves,' 5 but also cases where one defendant, being only second-
arily liable, is entitled to judgment against his codefendant for the entire
amount of plaintiff's recovery against him.' This means that master
and servant may be joined, though, the master's liability is predicated
solely upon the doctrine of rtespondeat superior.17
" State ex rel. Green County v. National Bank of Snow Hill, 193 N. C. 524,
137 S. E. 593 (1927) ; Harrison v. Southern Transit Corp., cited supra note 8;
Clark v. Bonsai & Co., 157 N. C. 270, 72 S. E. 954 (1911) ; Sullivan, Drew & Co.
v. Field, 118 N. C. 358, 24 S. E. 735 (1896) ; Wooten v. Maultsby, 69 N. C. 462
(1873). See also Killian v. Hanna, 193 'N. C. 17, 136 S. E. 246 (1927) ; State
ex rel. Cool v. Smith, 119 N. C. 350, 25 S. E. 958 (1896) ; Blackmore v. Winders,
144 N. C. 212, 56 S. E. 874 (1927). The result of the Harrison case, allowing the
owner of a passenger bus and its liability insurer to be joined as defendants, was
changed by statute. N. C. Pin. LAws 1927, c. 136, §6, now part of N. C. GEN.
STAT. (1943) §62-108. See Williamson v. Frederickson Motor Express Lines, 195
N. C. 682, 143 S. E. 256 (1928).
Berger v. Stevens, 197 N. C. 234, 148 S. E. 244 (1929).
1 Winders v. Southerland, 174 N. C. 235, 93 S. E. 726 (1917). See also Baber
v. Hanie, 163 N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57, 12 A. L. R. 1518 (1913), where, on a subro-
gation, rather than a contract doctrine, plaintiff sued several successive grantees
of land who had assumed a debt to plaintiff. The joinder question was not raised.
" G. S. 1-72 is dearly confined to contracts. G. S. 1-71 refers to "persons
severally liable upon the same obligation," and it is doubtful if the last two words
would include tort cases.
"' Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N. C. 445, 146 S. E. 79 (1929) ; Hipp v. Farrell,
169 N. C. 551, 86 S. E. 570 (1915) ; Tyler v. Hilton Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 163,
81 S. E. 139 (1914)."'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-240.
" Gregg v. City of Wilmington, 155 N. C. 18, 70 S. E. 1070 (1911). The
defendant secondarily liable, when sued alone, may have the person primarily liable
brought in to respond to the original defendant's cross-action. Bowman v. City
of Greensboro, 190 N. C. 611, 130 S. E. 502 (1925) ; Guthrie v. City of Durhama,
168 N. C. 573, 84 S. E. 859 (1915). All three of these cases involved a city
and an individual whose active negligence was allegedly the real cause of plain-
tiff's injury. Strictly speaking, the two may not be joint tort feasors. Brown v.
Town of Louisburg, 126 N. C. 701, 36 S. E. 166, 78 Am. St. Rep. 677 (1900).
But for the purposes of joinder by the plaintiff they are -treated as if they were.
"7Hough v. Southern Ry., 144 N. C. 692, 57 S. E. 469 (1907) ; Cotten v. The
Fisheries Products Co., 177 N. C. 56,97 S. E. 712 (1919). However, where plaintiff
is a fellow employee of defendant servant, the case against defendant master may
be dismissed because the Workmen's Compensation remedy against him is exclusive.
McCune v. Rhodes-Rhyne Manufacturing Co, 217 N. C. 351, 8 S. E. (2d) 219
(1940) ; Tscheiller v. National Weaving Co., 214 N. C. 449, 199 S. E. 623 (1938).
See also Britt v. Howell, 208 N. C. 519, 181 S. E. 619 (1935) ; Patton v. Champion
Fibre Co., 192 N. C. 48, 133 S. E. 174 (1926) ; cf. Pinnix v. Griffin, 221 N. C.
348, 20 S. E. (2d) 366 (1942) ; Gadsden v. George H. Crofts & Co., 175 N. C.
358, 95 S. E. 610, L. R. A. 1918E 226 (1918).
1946]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
While the Court's viewpoint on the matter is not always dear, it is
certain that in some of these situations the Court regards the action
against multiple defendants as presenting but one cause of action. This
has been plainly said in cases involving principal and surety,1 8 and in the
joint tort feasor cases 9 In cases founded on contract, G. S. 1-71 and
1-72 make it clear enough that the plaintiff may, if he wishes, sue the
defendants separately, and the same rule is clearly reached by decision
in the joint tort cases.20 Thus there is not merely a single cause of action
for purposes of enforcing the rule against splitting a single cause; but
there is no compelling necessity, in the interest of a purely technical con-
sistency, to disregard the purpose for which the decision is being made in
determining whether a given set of facts embraces one or more causes of
action.
Treating the case as presenting only one cause has the advantage
of requiring only that the joinder of parties provisions be satisfied. The
statutes governing joinder of causes may be disregarded, particularly
the requirement that all causes must affect all parties.2 ' That the latter
might give trouble may be illustrated by the joint tort feasor cases. If
the action against each were a separate cause, in view of the fact that
plaintiff might recover from one or more without recovering from
others, would each be affected by all causes ?22
ALTERNATIVE JOINDER
Apparently following a suggestion made in this REviEw,m the Gen-
eral Assembly of 1931 amended the statutes which are now G. S. 1-68
and 1-69 to permit alternative joinder of either plaintiffs or defendants.2 4
At the same time it inserted into the section respecting plaintiffs: "If,
upon the application of any party, it shall appear that such joinder may
embarrass or delay the trial, the court may order separate trials or make
" McCall v. Zachary, supra note 9.
"o Tyler v. Hilton Lumber Co., cited supra note 14; Hough v. Southern Ry.,
cited supra note 17. In the first of these the complaint contained three statements,
variously referred to as counts and as causes of action: (1) against the two de-
fendants; (2) and (3) against each defendant separately. The basic facts in each
were the same. The Court said there was actually the same cause of action stated
in different forms. In the Hough case, Judge Walker, at page 695, said: "This
is the substance of the cause of action which, being for a tort, may be made joint
by uniting all the tort feasors as defendants in one action; or several by suing each
in a separate action. The plaintiff, or party aggrieved by the wrong, may make
it joint or several, at his election, and it is not open to the wrongdoer to complain
of the election so made or to dictate how he shall make his choice. . . . His
election finally determines what shall be the character of the tort, whether joint
or several."
'0 See quotation from Hough v. Southern Ry., cited supra note 19. See also
Mode v. Penland, 93 N. C. 292 (1885).
'IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-123(7).
" Currently the right of contribution might be argued to satisfy this require-
ment, but the privilege of joinder antedates this statutory right.Proposals for Legislation in North Carolina (1930) 9 N. C. LAW REv. 13, 24.
2,N. C. PUB. LAwS 1931, c. 344.
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such other order as may be expedient." No such provision was written
into the section governing joinder of defendants, but G. S. 1-179 pro-
vides: "A separate trial between a plaintiff and any of several defend-
ants may be allowed by the court when, in its opinion, justice will thereby
be promoted.
'25
The 1931 amendment also added to G. S. 1-69: "If the plaintiff is
in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress, he may
join two or more defendants, to determine which is liable." No similar
provision was inserted in G. S. 1-68 as to plaintiffs in doubt as to which
of them is entitled to recover, but the mere authorization of alternative
joinder seems adequately to cover the situation.
These provisions make it clear that whenever the Court will say
that only one cause of action is involved, alternative joinder is permitted
on either side. However, no change was made in G. S. 1-123, governing
joinder of causes, and its requirement that all causes affect all parties
remains as a potential trouble maker in the alternative joinder field.
Accordingly, discussion of the relatively few cases is deferred until the
subject of joinder of parties and causes is reached.
CONSEQUENCES OF MISJOINDER OF PARTIES
Misjoinder of parties is not listed as a ground for demurrer by
G. S. 1-127. Consequently, with some exceptions,26 the Court has held
that such misjoinder-defined as joinder of an unnecessary party-can-
not be objected to by demurrer.2 7  Even when this is not expressly
" Granting of a separate trial under this provision is discretionary. Bryan v.
Spivey, 106 N. C. 95, 11 S. E. 510 (1890)...' Clark v. Bonsai & Co., cited supra note 10 (demurrer sustained and action
dismissed as to one defendant. However, while nominally the demurrer was for
misjoinder of parties, the decision hinged on whether a cause of action was stated
as to that defendant) ; McMillan v. Edwards, 75 N. C. 81 (1876) (court passed on
question when raised by demurrer, without indicating any impropriety in the pro-
cedure) ; Wall v. Fairley, 74 N. C. 464 (1875) (some defendants dismissed on
demurrer, this being a reversal of the decision below. It is not clear whether
these defendants demurred for misjoinder or failure to state a cause of action
against them. The court also passed on a demurrer for improper joinder of cer-
tain plaintiffs) ; Burns v. Ashworth, 72 N. C. 496 (1875) (record showed motion
to dismiss for misjoinder of parties, though on argument counsel said the motion
was based on misjoinder of causes; the Court said, whichever it was, it was waived
by failure to raise it by demurrer or answer, but later said joinder of unnecessary
parties is surplusage). A very recent apparent exception is Western N. C. Con-
ference v. Talley, 226 N. C. 654, 39 S. E. (2d) 816 (1946). There defendants,
after answering, moved to dismiss as to one plaintiff on the ground that it was not
a proper party plaintiff. The Court, in a per curiam, opinion, said this was in
effect a demurrer for misjoinder of parties and came too late. The cases cited
do not support the proposition that misjoinder of parties only is to be raised by
demurrer. See note 30 infra.
7Star Furniture Company, Inc. v. Carolina and Northwestern Ry., 195 N. C.
636, 143 S. E. 242 (1928) ; Ingram v. Corbit, 177 N. C. 318, 99 S. E. 18 (1919) ;
Winders v. Southerland, 174 N. C. 235, 93 S. E. 726 (1917) ; Abbott v. Hancock,
123 N. C. 99, 31 S. E. 268 (1898) ; State ex reL Hoover v.. Berryhill, 84 N. C. 133
(1881); McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES
(1929 ed.) §§227, 441. Thii should be distinguished from a defect of parties,
which is expressly listed as a ground of demurrer by G. S. 1-127. The latter, is
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stated, the Court has said that joinder of an unnecessary party is harm-
less surplusage. 2 The error can be cured by disclaimer and judgment
for costs,29 by permitting withdrawal in the case of a plaintiff, 0 or, in
case of a defendant, by allowing a motion to strike his name81 or by
granting a motion to dismiss as to him.32
Of course, there is no such thing as misjoinder of a proper party,
even though, strictly speaking, such party may not be a necessary party.P
Therefore, when the Court refers to misjoinder of an unnecessary party,
it must mean the joinder of an improper party. The consequences of
this, as the rules outlined in the preceding paragraph show, are not very
serious. The case continues between all proper and necessary parties,
with the improper party, if he remains in the case at all, having nominal
status only and being interested only in the assessment of costs-against
him if a plaintiff and in his favor if a defendant. However, these rules
interpreted as a failure to join a necessary party, sometimes referred to as "mis-
joinder" of a necessary party. Shuford v. Yarborough, cited supra note 9; Sul-
livan, Drew & Co. v. Field, cited supra note 10. It is a fatal defect unless the
necessary party is brought in under G. S. 1-73; and the statute of limitations may
continue to run as to him until he is brought in. Fishell v. Evans, cited supra
note 4. Joining as a plaintiff one who is a necessary party defendant has also
been called a misjoinder -of parties. Paxton v. Wood, 77 N. C. 11 (1877). For a
case completely confusing the usual distinction between misjoinder of parties and
defect of parties, see Lanier v. The Pullman Co., 180 N. C. 406, 105 S. E. 21
(1920).
"oore County v. Burns, 224 N. C. 700, 32 S. E. (2d) 225 (1944) ; Balfour
Quarry Co. v. West Construction Co., 151 N. C. 345, 66 S. E. 217 (1909) ; Emry
v. Parker, 111 N. C. 261, 16 S. E. 236 (1892); Young v. Young, 81 N. C. 92
(1879).
" Sullivan, Drew & Co. v. Field, cited supra note 10; Green v. Green, 69 N. C.
294 (1873) (rule applies whether unnecessary parties are plaintiffs or defendants).80 McLaughlin v. Raleigh C. & S. Ry., 174 N. C. 182, 93 S. E. 748 (1917);
Pritchard v. Mitchell, 139 N. C. 54, 51 5. E. 783 (1905); Jarrett v. Gibbs, 107
N. C. 303, 12 S. E. 272 (1890) (lower court reversed for holding it had no power
to permit withdrawal over defendants objection). In McMillan v. Baxley, 112
N. C. 578, 16 S. E. 845, 18 L. R. A. 850 (1893), the Court found no error where
the trial judge refused to strike the name of a plaintiff on motion of the defend-
ants. Among other things, it said that misjoinder of parties is to be taken advan-
tage of by demurrer, thus apparently being in accord with the cases cited in note
26 and in conflict with those cited in note 27. But it recognized the rule that
joinder of unnecessary parties is mere surplusage. See also Western N. C. Con-
ference v. Talley, cited supra note 26. These two last-mentioned cases, though
apparently mistaken as to the office of the demurrer, possibly indicate that a motion
to strike or dismiss should be made before answer.
"'Winders v. Southerland, cited supra note 27; Worth v. Knickerbocker Trust
Co., 152 N. C. 242, 67 S. E. 590 (1910).
'-'Williams v. Hooks, 200 N. C. 419, 157 S. E. 65 (1931). This case indicates
that if the Supreme Court is really convinced a defendant is an improper party
and may be prejudiced by being held in the case to await final judgment, it will
not hesitate.to reverse the lower court's refusal to dismiss. The Court has also
reversed the over-ruling of a demurrer and dismissed as to improper defendants
in a case where it is not clear whether the demurrer was for misjoinder or failure
to state a cause of action. Wall v. Fairley, cited sulra note 26. Cf. Clark v.
Bonsai & Co., cited supra notes 10 and 26; Emry v. Parker, cited supra note 28.
"In Choate Rental Co. v. Justice, 212 N. C. 523, 193 S. E. 817 (1937), after
holding that the rental agent could not maintain the action because the owner was
the real party in interest, the Court still thought the agent was a proper party who
could be left in the case, in the discretion of the lower court, after the owner
had been joined.
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are largely confined to situations where a plaintiff, joined with others,
patently has no right to relief or does not ask for any,34 or where a
defendant, joined with others, patently is not liable or no relief is
sought against him.3 5
The great difficulty is in the cases where several plaintiffs are each
dearly seeling relief or where relief is dearly sought against each of
several defendants. In such cases, if misjoinder of parties is found, mis-
joinder of causes of action is usually also found, and, as subsequently
indicated, the consequences of the so-called "dual misjoinder" are more
serious.
II. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION
As already pointed out, a handy way to avoid trouble over the pro-
priety of joinder of causes, is to decide that4the complaint states only
one cause. 6 In addition to the examples already mentioned, the fol-
lowing illustrate this techhique: an action for defamation, alleging sev-
eral slanderous statements in the same conversation ;37 an action by a
8 Occasionally a case arises where two plaintiffs are apparently seeking relief
but, very probably, only one of them is entitled to it, and the joinder may reflect
counsel's uncertainty as to which has the right of action or is the real party in
interest. The effect, in these cases, of invoking the rule that joinder of an un-
necessary party is surplusage, may be to permit alternative joinder of plaintiffs;
and this was apparently done in several cases antedating the alternative joinder
provisions of G. S. 1-68. Virginia Trust Co. v. Webb, 206 N. C. 247, 173 S. E.
598 (1934) (assignee and assignor as plaintiffs, where the assignment was for
security only) ; Star Furniture Company, Inc. v. Carolina and Northwestern Ry.,
cited supra note 27 (consignor and consignee); Abbott v. Hancock, cited supra
note 27 (wife individually and as next friend of insane husband suing for loss
of services resulting from seduction of minor daughter). In this type of case
the Court may settle the matter by saying that, if the defendant is liable, it makes
no difference to him who gets the money so long as either is the rightful claim-
ant, since both will be bound by the judgment. See Bank of Blowing Rock v.
McIver, 217 N. C. 623, 9 S. E. (2d) 25 (1940). See also Balfour Quarry Co.
v. West Construction Co., cited infra note 182; Black Mountain R. IL v. Ocean
Accident and Guarantee Corp., 172 N. C. 636, 90 S. E. 763 (1916), same case 175
N. C. 566, 96 S. E. 25 (1918).
' The rules have also been applied where garnishees are named as defendants
in the action. Worth v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 152 N. C. 242, 67 S. E. 590
(1910). In this situation, while some relief is clearly sought against them, they
are not liable to plaintiff on his basic cause of action.
"Actually, a number of cases discuss joinder of causes when the action could
easily be said to involve but one cause. See McINTosH, NoRTH CAROLINA PaAc-
TiC AND PRoCEDuIE IN CIVL CASEs (1929 ed.) §417. However, while such a case
will occasionally be pointed out, it is not the purpose of this article to discuss what
constitutes a single cause of action; and, in the main, if the Court indicates there
are several causes, it is accepted as a true joinder case for purposes of the article.
It may be mentioned, however, that the provision of G. S. 1-123 permitting joinder
of causes arising out of the same transaction is, in itself, an invitation to a narrow
view of what constitutes a single cause of action.
37 Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 189 N. C, 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925).
The complaint alleged different slanderous words in the same conversation as two
causes of action. The Court quotes two texts to the effect there is but one
cause. In the trial below the plaintiff recovered $10,000 on each of his "causes,"
and the Supreme Court reversed one recovery as the words were privileged, and
sustained the other. So it was well for the plaintiff that it had not been treated
as one cause of action, with one recovery assessed, at the trial.
19461
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decedent's daughter against her mother and brother to have a trust de-
clared for her benefit as to land, to have a cash equalization, and to
secure a share of the personal property, all under an alleged paper writ-
ing of the deceased ;38 and an action to correct a deed and recover
possession. 39
Where the Court finds several causes of action, the propriety of their
joinder is governed by G. S. 1-123. This statute sets forth seven classes
of causes which may be joined. The first, most notorious, and most
troublesome is that covering causes arising out of "the same transaction,
or transaction connected with the same subject of action." 40 The other
six classes, in summary, are: (2) contract, express or implied; (3) in-
juries to person or property; (4) injuries to character; (5) claims to
recover realty; (6) claims to recover personalty; and (7) claims against
a trustee.41  Express permission is, given to join legal and equitable
causes. In fact, as long as only one plaintiff and one defendant are
involved, there are only two substantial limitations: (a) the causes
joined must all belong to the same class; and (b) they must not require
separate places of trial.
The classes, particularly the first three, are broad enough to permit
considerable freedom of joinder. But they are not broad enough to
permit joinder of tort and contract causes unless the transaction clause
is satisfied. 42 Joinder is permissible, without reference to that clause, if
the tort can be waived and that cause grounded on a contract theory.43
While in the early days of the Code the Court apparently denied the
" Ricks v. Wilson, 151 N. C. 46, 65 S. E. 614 (1909). The Court, while twice
saying there was but one cause, discussed and relied on cases permitting joinder of
causes and parties. Cf. England v. Garner, 86 N. C. 366 (1882).
so Ely v. Early, 94 N. C. 1 (1886). Action originally was for possession of two
tracts. Plaintiff was permitted to amend to request correction of a deed he had
inadvertently given for one of the tracts. The Court said there was still but one
cause of action and the amendment related back for purposes of the statute of
limitations. The propriety of including several tracts in the action was apparently
not questioned.
," "And Mr. Pomeroy, in his treatise on Remedies and Remedial Rights, crit-
icizes the opinion and says the Judge is 'afloat as to the legal import of the subject
of action.' And we think he might truly have added that not a few other Judges
and commentators are 'afloat' upon the legal import of 'the same transaction,'
'transactions connected with the same subject of action,' 'the object of the action,'
and 'causes of action,' and the nice and refined distinctions between them.... And
so complex, uncertain and defiant of logic has the subject proved, that the Courts
have failed to derive any aid from even 'the reason of the thing,' that dernicer resort
of some Judges when all other resources have failed." Ashe, J., in Young v.
Young, 81 N. C. 92, 97 (1879). For discussion of the meaning of the transaction
clause, see MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIvIL CASES
(1929 ed.) §418.
,' This section contains several exceptional provisions for mortgage foreclosure
actions, but these will not be dealt with in this article.
' Pressley v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 226 N. C. 518, 39 S. E.
(2d) 382 (1946); Hodges v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R., 105 N. C. 170, 10
S. E. 917 (1890). Cf. Simons v. Southern Home Ins. Co., 203 N. C. 146, 164
S. E. 730 (1932).
' 3 Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 (1877).
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right to joint tort and contract even when arising from the same trans-
action, 4 it has now long been clear that this is permissible.45 Of course,
the alleged breach of contract and the alleged tort are often simply
alternative theories grounded on the same basic facts, as may be true
when negligence and breach of warranty or fraud and breach of war-
ranty are joined; and the plaintiff is not then entitled to double recovery.
This has led recently to difficulties over the question of whether, at the
trial, plaintiff may be compelled to elect upon which theory to pro-
ceed 4 6 though there seems to be no compelling reason against sub-
mitting both theories to the jury under appropriate instructions.47 There
has also been a recent suggestion that an election may be compelled
between express and implied contract theories ;48 but, while this finds.
support in the language of one earlier case,4 9 our Court has approved
submission of an implied contract issue to be passed upon by the jury
"N. C. Land Co. v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 329 (1873) ; Doughty v. A. & N. C. R. R.,
78 N. C. 22 (1878). In the first of these the matter was complicated by the
presence of several defendants, but Rodman, J., apparently rejected the argument
that causes could be joined under the transaction clause though not within any one
of the other six subdivisions. He thought (page 332) that that construction "would
produce all the inconveniences and confusion which it was the object of all the
rules regulating the joinder of actions to prevent." However, it would be possible
to interpret the language as confined to situation? involving different causes affect-
ing different defendants. In the Doughty case there was but a single defendant
and a single plaintiff.
' Hatcher v. Williams, 225 N. C. 112, 33 S. E. (2d) 617 (1945) ; Peitzman v.
Town of Zebulon, 219 N. C. 473, 14 S. E. (2d) 416 (1941) ; Hawk v. Pine Lumber
Co., 145 N. C. 47, 58 S. E. 603 (1907); Smith v. Newberry, 140 N. C. 385, 53
S. E. 234 (1906) ; Reynolds v. Railroad, 136 N. C. 345, 48 S. E. 765 (1904).
"Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N. C. 158, 16 S. E. (2d) 668 (1941)
(plaintiff claimed he suffered damage from eating rancid lard sold to him by
defendant. Both negligence and breach of warranty submitted to jury, defend-
ant's motion to compel election being denied. The Supreme Court held the negli-
gence cause should have been nonsuited as plaintiff's evidence showed contributory
negligence; and this eliminated the necessity of passing on the election question) ;
Simpson v. The American Oil Co., 219 N. C. 595, 14 S. E. (2d) 638 (1941), same
case, 217 N. C. 542, 8 S. E. (2d) 813 (1940). At first trial complaint alleged
negligence and breach of warranty in sale of insecticide spray. Supreme Court
raised question, without deciding it, as to whether defendant could have compelled
election. Plaintiff's judgment was reversed because the Court thought the charge
could be interpreted as permitting the jury to assess damages on each theory and
add them together. At the second trial the judge denied the defendant's motion
to compel election, but submitted the case only on the theory of express warranty.
Plaintiff's judgment, for $7,000 as compared with $5,000 at the first trial, was sus-
tained, with Stacy, C. J., and Winborne, J., dissenting without opinion and Barn-
hill, J., not sitting. See also Harding v. Southern Loan and Ins. Co., 218 N. C.
129, 10 S. E. (2d) 599 (1940) ; Horton v. Carolina Coach Co., 216 N. C. 567, 5
S. E. (2d) 828 (1939); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
IN CIvIL CASES (1929 ed.) §§412, 414. Cf. Womack v. Carter, 160 N. C. 286, 75
S. E. 1102 (1912), holding that counts for conversion and for money had and
received, based on the same transaction, stated but a single cause of action.
'" In Craven County v. The Investment Co., 201 N. C_. 523, 160 S. E. 753
(1931), the lower court was sustained in denying a motion to compel an election
between tort and contract theories, though the facts were much different from
those in the cases cited in note 46. See also Fields vs. Brown, 160 N. C. 295, 76
S. E. 8 (1912) ; Long v. Fields, 104 N. C. 221, 10 S. E. 253 (1889).
,Graham v. Hoke, 219 N. C. 755, 14 S. E. (2d) 490 (1941).
"Hayman v. Davis, 182 N. C. 563, 109 S. E. 554 (1921).
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if it fails to find that an express contract exists.50 However, these cases
do not undertake to deny the right of joinder at the pleading stage, and
full discussion of the question of election at trial is beyond the scope of
this article.51
The propriety of joinder of causes has been sustained in a great
variety of situations, in most of which the application of the statute is
plain.52 Two are worth special mention. In McGovern v. Insurance
50 Lipe v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 206 N. C. 24, 173 S. E. 316 (1924) ;
Stokes v. Taylor, 104 N. C. 394, 10 S. E. 566 (1889). See also Coley v. Dalrymple,
225 N. C. 67, 33 S. E. (2d) 477 (1945); Grady v. Faison, 224 N. C. 567, 31
S. E. (2d) 760 (1944); Simpson v. The American Oil Co., cited supra note 46
(question raised, but not decided, whether an election could be compelled between
express and implied warranty); Jones v. Mial, 79 N. C. 165 (1878); McINTos,
NoRTH CARoriNA PRAcrIcE AND PRocEDuRE IN Civm CASES (1929 ed.) §410.
Also beyond the scope of this article is full discussion of the harsh and ques-
tionable doctrine of election of remedies, which has found its most frequent appli-
cation in the cases holding that a plaintiff may not proceed on theories involving
both affirmance and disaffirmance of a contract or sale. Under this doctrine plain-
tiff may find that by bringing suit on one theory, or even by some extra-judicial
action, he has made a final and binding election. See, for example: Stewart v.
Salisbury Realty and Ins. Co., 159 N. C. 230, 74 S. E. 736 (1912) ; Davis v. But-
ters Lumber Co., 132 N. C. 233, 43 S. E. 650 (1903). Compare, particularly with
the Stewart case, Wiggins v. Landis, 188 N. C. 316, 124 S. E. 621 (1924). It
seems to follow that if plaintiff ipcludes both theories in his complaint he can be
compelled to elect, F. E. Lykes & Co., Inc. v. Grove, 201 N. C. 254, 159 S. E.
360 (1931), though in at least one case both theories were allowed to go to the
jury. Troxler v. Building Co., 137 N. C. 51, 49 S. E. 58 (1904). Cf. Hatcher
v. Williams, 225 N. C. 112, 33 S. E. (2d) 617 (1945); Fields v. Brown, cited
supra note 47; Batchelor v. Macon, 67 N. C. 181 (1872). The same approach has
been used to hold that an unsuccessful suit on a contract is a bar to a subsequent
suit for its reformation, Leaksville Light and Power Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,
193 N. C. 618, 137 S. E. 817 (1927) ; that two theories of disaffirmance may be
inconsistent (with an implication that there must be an election), Smith v. Greens-
boro Joint Stock Land Bank, 213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481 (1938) ; and that filing
of a lien on the theory that the furnisher of material was a subcontractor was an
election of remedies which precluded a subsequent attempt to recover on the theory
that the material was furnished directly to the owner, Economy Pumps, Inc. v.
F. W. Woolworth Co., 220 N. C. 499, 17 S. E. (2d) 639 (1941); Doggett Lumber
Co. v. Perry, 212 N. C. 713, 194 S. E. 475 (1938). See also Lyon v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 165 N. C. 143, 81 S. E. 1 (1914); Spruill v. Bank of Ply-
mouth, 163 N. C. 43, 79 S. E. 262 (1913) ; Clark v. East Lake Lumber Co., 158
N. C. 139, 73 S. E. 793 (1912); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcrICE AND
PROCEDURE IN Civxi CASES (1929 ed.) §§408, 413, 414. Subsequently mentioned
briefly in the text is the question of whether the alternative joinder provisions may
operate to modify the doctrine.
"2The following are examples: (1) to set aside deeds for mental incompetence
of grantor and undue influence of grantee, Goodson v. Lehmon, 225 N. C. 514, 35
S. E. (2d) 623 (1945); (2) to renew a judgment and to correct it to make it
speak the truth, Curlee v. Scales, 223 N. C. 788, 28 5. B. (2d) 576 (1944)
(dictum) ; (3) to recover for negligent injury and to set aside a release allegedly
obtained by fraud, KIllian v. Hanna, 193 N. C. 17, 1365S. E. 246 (1927); cf.
Joynerv. P. L. Woodard & Co., 201 N. C. 315, 160 5. B. 288 (1931) ; (4) against
a carrier for delay in delivering goods and for damages to same goods during
return shipment, Lyon v. Atlantic Coast Line a. R., cted spr  note 51 ; (5) for
breach of contract and for a statutory penalty (joinder may be justified either by
transaction clause or contract clause), or for several statutory penalties, Robert-
son v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 148 N. C. 323, 62 S. E. 413 (1908) ; State ex tel.
McCullen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 146 N. C. 568, 60 S. E. 506 (1908) ; State
ex tel. Maggett v. Roberts, 108 N. C. 174, 12 S. E. 890 (1891) ; (6) for specific
performance and damages ,(which could easily be called one cause of action),
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Company," plaintiff had, at different times, taken out fifteen policies of
insurance on her own life and the lives of her children and grandchildren.
She discovered they were not the type of policy she claimed defendant's
agents represented they were. She sued for damages for the misrepre-
sentations as to all fifteen policies. Three judges believed that if sep-
arate causes were involved, their joinder was justified by the transaction
clause. The other two judges felt that if the transaction clause covered
this, there was no need for the other six classes in the statute, but they
found the joinder justified under class three (injuries, with or without
force, to person or property).
In Hamlin V. Tucker," plaintiff sued a single defendant for: (1)
harboring and maintaining plaintiff's wife; (2) converting personal
property which plaintiff claimed jure mariti; (3) inducing the wife to
execute to defendant a deed to her land, under which defendant received
rents; and (4) conversion of personal property covered by a marriage
settlement between plaintiff and his wife. Chief Justice Pearson, writing
for a unanimous Court, held that the causes all arose out of the same
subject of action.55
Winders v. Hill, 141 N. C. 694, 54 S. E. 440 (1906) ; (7) to have plaintiffs title
declared and for damages or possession or rents, Tyler v. Capeheart, 125 N. C.
64, 34 S. E. 108 (1899) ; Jennings v. Reeves, 101 N. C. 447, 7 S. E. 897 (1888) ;
Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N. C. 1 (1885); (8) for possession and for judgment on
the debt secured by the property or for foreclosure of the lien thereon, Kiger v.
Harmon, 113 N. C. 406, 18 S. E. 515 (1893) ; Martin v. McNeely, 101 N. C. 634,
8 S. E. 231 (1888) ; (9) for money judgment and to subject land to a charge for
its payment, Outland v. Outland, 113 N. C. 74, 18 S. E. 72 (1893); (10) two
claims of one plaintiff against an estate, Martin v. Goode, 111 N. C. 288, 16 S. E.
232, 32 Am. St. Rep. 799 (1892) ; (11) against executors for accounting covering
the activities of their testator in his successive capacities as guardian and admin-
istrator of plaintiffs intestate, Alexander v. Wolfe, 83 N. C. 272 (1880) ; (12) on
a note and on an open account, Sutton v. McMillan, 72 N. C. 102 (1875); (13)
against an official and his surety on bonds covering different terms, the surety
being liable on both bonds, Syme v. Bunting, 86 N. C. 175 (1882) ; (14) for a
money judgment and mandamus to compel provision for its payment (not clear
whether regarded as one cause or two), McLendon v. The Commissioners of
Anson County, 71 N. C. 38 (1874). Since enactment of N. C. Pun. LAWS, 1933,
c. 349, amending what is now N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-512, the rule of- this
last case has been changed and the claim must be reduced to judgment before
mandamus is sought. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Leland, 214 N. C. 235, 199 S. E.
7 (1938). Cf. Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 198 N. C. 339, 151 S. E. 626
(1930), where a misjoinder objection was ovefruled by treating an amendment to
the complaint as a permissible counterclaim or set-off to the answer.
"' 141 N. C. 367, 54 S. E. 287 (1906).
'72 N. C. 502 (1875).
" "Here.. . the subject-matter of controversy cannot be settled without decid-
ing, not merely whether the defendailt enticed the plaintiffs wife to leave him, and
harbored and maintained her in violation of his original rights, but whether he did
not also, as a part of his interference with the marital right of the plaintiff, induce
her to allow him to carry off and convert her paraphernalia, wardrobe, bookcase,
cottage furniture, etc., and whether he did not by reason of her dependent position,
induce her to execute a deed for her land, and thereby frustrate the purpose of
the marriage settlement or to put such a cloud upon his rights under it as to
entitle the plaintiff to the aid of the Court as connected with or germane to the
charge of having enticed his wife to abandon him, and harbored and maintained
her in her resistance to his lawful authority' 72 N. C. 502, 503. The Chief Jus-
19461
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IMPROPER JOINDER OF CAUSES
As already indicated, even when only one plaintiff and one defend-
ant are involved, G. S. 1-123 is so worded as ordinarily to prevent
joinder of tort and contract actions unless they fall under the transaction
clause. In enforcing the rule, the Court merely carries out the mandate
of the statute. Determination of whether the causes do fall under the
transaction clause is a very troublesome problem, and occasionally the
Court has not given quite as broad an interpretation to it as might be
possible. The recent case of Pressley v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Company56 furnishes an illustration. Plaintiff alleged: (1) that he
was injured by the negligence of defendant, his employer; and (2) that
when he reported back to work defendant demanded a release exonerat-
ing defendant from liability for his injuries and, when he refused to
give it, defendant wrongfully discharged him. This is certainly a situa-
tion in which common sense indicates that joinder ought to be permitted.
There is an argument to be made that the basic subject of action is the
negligent injury, and that the transaction involving the discharge is a
transaction "connected with" that subject. The Court, however, re-
jected this and found that, while the two causes might tell a connected
story, they were not connected with the same subject of action. Since
the first cause was in tort and the second in contract, it followed that
the two could not be joined.57 However, while somewhat technical, the
decision is not a legally unreasonable construction of a statute which, at
best, is of very uncertain meaning.
58
There are a few cases in which the joinder is held improper because
one cause must conform to a special statutory procedure which the
Court does not believe can be integrated into the procedure of an or-
dinary civil action. For instance, this has been held with reference to
tice also stated that should the action become so complicated and confused as to
embarrass the court, the remedy would be for the court ex mero inotu to refuse
to pass on matters not germane to the principal subject of action. This latter
was afterwards characterized as dictum and as pointing to a procedure which
would have been a solution had the draftsmen of the Code anticipated the problem
and adopted it. Young v. Young, 81 N. C. 92 (1879). But see Craven County v.
The Investment Co., 201 N. C. 523, 160 S. E. 753 (1931), where the Court calls
attention to it without intimating that it could not be followed.
56 226 N. C. 518, 39 S. E. (2d) 382 (1946).
"'Cf. Edgerton v. Powell, 72 N. C. 64 (1875). Plaintiff sued to foreclose a
mortgage on one moiety in land and to recover possession of the other moiety
under a different chain of title. The Court, describing the causes as affecting
different tracts, held that they did not arise out of the same transaction or trans-
actions connected with the same subject of action.
"8 The opinion refers to "the plain and unambiguous language of the statute
which defines and limits the causes that may be united in one action." 226 N. C.
518, 519, 39 S. E. (2d) 382, 383. Since the case turned on construction of the
transaction clause, this is in sharp contrast with the language of Ashe, J., quoted
supra note 40.
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suits against railroads in which one of the causes was a demand for
compensation for the taking of an easement.59
Misjoinder may also be found when the Court believes two causes
are so inconsistent as to be incompatible. Our Court has several times
said that even if two causes are to some extent inconsistent, the com-
plaint is not always on that account demurrable. 0 But there are nu-
merous indications that inconsistency may spell trouble. While the
classification is hardly helpful in predicting results in new situations, it
can be pointed out that the North Carolina cases seem to show three
general stages of inconsistency: (1) The causes are inconsistent in the
sense that allowing recovery on bQth would be double recovery, but
joinder is still permitted at the pleading stage and election is forced, if
at all, only at the trial stage. Such are the cases, to which reference has
been made, involving joinder of express and implied contract, or joinder
of fraud or negligence with breach of warranty.61 (2) The causes are
inconsistent and an election can be forced, probably at the pleading
stage, but plaintiff may still maintain independent actions. (3) The
causes are so inconsistent that election can be forced at the pleading
stage and (while there may be some exceptions) an election once made,
whether in this manner or by bringing suit on one cause only or even by
extra-judicial action, is binding and plaintiff must win on the first theory
chosen or not at all. At this latter stage the doctrine of election of
remedies is operating in full force and the matter has become in reality
a question of substantive law and not a true problem of joinder in
pleadings.
0 2
An illustration of the intermediate stage is Huggins v. Waters,6
where plaintiff alleged that he leased a hotel from defendant W and
"9Abernathy v. South and Western Ry., 150 N. C. 97, 63 S. E. 180 (1908);
Allen v. The Wilmington and Weldon P. R., 102 N. C. 381, 9 S. E. 4 (1889). See
also Dalton v. State Highway and Public Works Commission, 223 N. C. 406, 27
S. E. (2d) 1 (1943), holding that a claim for breach of contract could not be
included in a special proceeding to recover damages for the taking of land by the
Highway Commission.
.o Shuford v. Yarborough, 198 N. C. 5, 150 S. E. 618 (1929) (facts given
throw little light on what was meant by the statement) ; Worth v. Knickerbocker
Trust Co., 152 N. C. 242, 67 S. E. 590 (1910) (but Court found the two causes
were both grounded on theories of disaffirmance and were, therefore, consistent.
Two judges dissented on the ground there should be a repleader to state plainly
the single cause they believed to be involved). However, in Paxton v. Wood, 77
N.'C. 11, 14 (1877), the Court said, "we can hardly suppose even the liberality of
C. C. P. will warrant the joinder of inconsistent causes of action."
" See the prior text discussion and the cases cited notes 46 through 50. The
Court has said that decision of the fraud action would not be res judicata as to a
subsequent suit for breach of contract. Harding v. Southern Loan and Insurance
Co., cited supra note 46.
2Cases cited supra note 51.
154 N. C. 443, 70 S. E. 842 (1911). The case actually reached trial in the
lower court, but the Supreme Court, by stating that one cause alleged in the com-
plaint was destrdfctive of the other, seems to imply that an election could have
been forced before the trial was reached.
1946]
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defendant B obstructed the drain through which the hotel sewage was
carried away. The Court held that W could be liable for breach of
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment only if B's act was rightful; and,
of course, B could be liable only if his act was wrongful. Consequently,
the two causes were inconsistent and the Court said plaintiff would
have to elect; but in a later version of the litigation,"4 the Court said it
was proper for plaintiff, instead of electing, to institute independent
actions against W and B. Since the case obviously involves joinder of
parties as well as causes, further discussion of it will be postponed;
but it may be pointed out here that the rule of the first version of the
case may have been changed by the alternative joinder provisions.
THE VENUE CASES
As already stated, G. S. 1-123 limits joinder of causes by providing
that the causes must not require different places of trial. This limita-
tion has probably not been a very serious one. At least, the cases are
few in number and they involve not an attack on the joinder, but an
attempt to remove the entire action. Of course, removal of the entire
case is a sensible solution when one cause requires trial elsewhere and
the other causes can be tried at either place. In such a case, in fact,
G. S. 1-123 is not applicable, because the causes do not require trial at
different places.
In passing upon motions to remove, the Court tends to select a prin-
cipal cause of action and decide the motion by reference to its proper
venue, regarding the other causes as incidental. Thus, in an action to
establish claims against H and to set aside H's deed to W, the latter
was thought to be the controlling purpose of the suit, and the entire
case was ordered removed to the county in which the land was situated. 5
Similarly, where the Court thought the action was basically one to
settle rights to real estate, the entire case was removed though it in-
cluded demands for a partnership accounting and other relief.08 And
in cases involving recovery of personal property, proper venue for the
case seems to turn on whether that relief is the principal relief sought or
is merely incidental.67
, Huggins v. Waters, 167 N. C. 197, 83 S. E. 334 (1914).
" Wofford-Fain & Co. v. Hampton, 173 N. C. 686, 192 S. E. 612 (1917). Cf.
N. C. Joint Stock Land Bank v. Kerr, 206 N. C. 610, 175 S. E. 102 (1934), where,
venue not being involved, plaintiff's basic claim against the principal defendant
was held to be the principal relief sought, and a demand to set aside an assign-
ment of a judgment from the principal defendant to others was thought to be
incidental.
6 Falls of Neuse Manufacturing Co. v. Browder, 105 N. C. 440, 11 S. E. 313
(1890).
oodard v. Sauls, 134 N. C. 274, 46 S. E. 507 (1904) (removal to county
where property situated denied); Edgerton v. Games, 142 N. C. 223, 55 S. E. 145
(1906). Lower court, finding recovery of property to be chief cause of action,
ordered removal. Supreme Court affirmed, not holding squarely that it was the
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One case dearly recognized and discussed the provision of G. S.
1-123, but there, as usual, the motion was for removal of the entire
case, and it was also clear that, if there were two causes, one of which
had to be removed, the second could properly be tried at the new venue,
also.68 In-a dictum in another case, the Court stressed the desirability
of permitting causes arising out of the same transaction to be tried at
the same time and place,69 though this would hardly be decisive if the
causes really require different places of trial.
CONSEQUENCES OF MISJOIND4 OF CA-USES
By the express terms of G. S. 1-127, misjoinder of causes is a ground
for demurrer. It follows, under G. S. 1-134, that when the misjoinder
appears on the face of the complaint, as it almost invariably will, failure
to demur is a waiver of the objection; and the cases so hold. 0 And even
when the objection is properly presented and sustained, G. S. 1-132
provides that "the judge shall, upon such terms as are just, order the
action to be divided into as many actions as are necessary for the
proper determination of the causes of action therein mentioned." This
mandate has, of course, been followed by the Court.71 The consequences
of simple misjoinder of causes are not, therefore, very serious, and there
chief cause, but saying that since it was a cause, action below was correct. How-
ever, it distinguished the Woodard case on the ground that the recovery of the
property there was requested only to apply it on the principal judgment sought.
"' Richmond Cedar Works v. J. L. Roper Lumber Co., 161 N. C. 604, 77 S. E.
770 (1913). The Court was unable definitely to determine whether plaintiff was
suing in conversion (transitory) or for damages to the freehold, with conversion
merely alleged in aggravation of damages (local), or both. It remanded the case
for repleader.
",State ex rel., McCullen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 146 N. C. 568, 570, 60
S. E. 506, 507 (1908). Judge Connor, referring to causes based on breach of
contract and statutory penalty, said: "It would seem that, as the action in re-
spect of the first cause was properly brought in Craven County, and the two
causes of action arose out of the same transaction, both the letter and spirit of
the law would be met by permitting them to be tried in that county ... It is
manifest that practically the same evidence will be relevant in the trial of both
causes of action." Actually the question was not before the Court, because the
defendant demurred on the ground that the venue was wrong for the penalty action,
and the Court held that the question could not be raised by demurrer. Cf. Kellis
v. Welch, 201 N. C. 39, 158 S. E. 742 (1931), where motion to remove was by
one of three defendants, but the Court, stressing the desirability of a single trial,
treated the case as presenting a single cause, ralher than several and denied
removal.
"0Teague v. Collins, 134 N. C. 62, 45 S. E. 1035 (1903); Kiger v. Harmon,
113 N. C. 406, 18 S. E. 515 (1893) (objection waived if not taken "by demurrer
or answer"); McMillen v. Baxley, 112 N. C. 578, 16 S. E. 845 (1893); Finley v.
Hayes, 81 N. C. 368 (1879) (waived by failure to demur, because it appeared on
the face of the complaint, even though answer attempted to raise the objection).
See also Lanier v. The John L. Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200, 98 S. E. 593
(1919).
'See, e.g., Pressley v. The Great Atantic & Pacific Tea Co., 226 N. C. 518,
39 S. E. (2d) 382 (1946); Hodges v. Wilmington and Wedon R. R., 105 N. C.
170, 10 S. E. 917 (1890). In Doughty v. A. & N. C. R. R., 78 N. C. 22 (1878),
the trial court dismissed instead of dividing. This was affirmed because, while
plaintiff appealed from the sustaining of the demurrer, he had made no express
demand below that the action be divided instead of dismissed.
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must be many cases in which the defendant's counsel thinks making the
objection is hardly worthwhile. However, as pointed out below, more
serious consequences ensue if the misjoinder is one of both causes and
parties.
The actions in which the Court finds that a particular statutory
cause of action cannot be joined with other causes, have not been divided.
The Court has stricken out the non-statutory cause as "irrelevant mat-
ter,"72 and has also disregarded the statutory cause as surplusage.
78
The venue cases may also be subject to special rules. If two causes
are joined which really require different places of trial, the Court has
indicated that the objection should be taken by motion to change venue,
prior to any demurrer for misjoinder; and that upon the objection being
so raised, the action could be divided and each part assigned to its
proper venue.
7 4
III. JOINDER OF PARTIES AND CAUSES
The question of whether there is a misjoinder of both parties and
causes has been before the North Carolina Supreme Court at least 130
times since adoption of the Code, and .in slightly less than two-thirds
of these cases the joinder has been held proper.
It was decided soon after the Code was adopted that the Code did
not intend to restrict the joinder privileges previously accorded in the
equity practice; and that, therefore, misjoinder would not be found un-
less the complaint would have been multifarious under the pre-Code
equity practice. 5 It was also recognized that the Code intended to
liberalize the rules of joinder at law and not to prescribe more narrow
rules; and that, therefore, if the joinder was permitted at common law
" Abernathy v. South and Western Ry., cited supra note 59.
" Allen v. The Wilmington and Weldon R. R., cited supra note 59." Richmond Cedar Works v. J. L. Roper Lumber Co., cited supra note 68. See
also State ex rel. McCullen v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., cited supra note 69.
"'Young v. Young, 81 N. C. 92 (1879). In State ex rel. Hoover v. Berryhill,
84 N. C. 133, 135 (1881), Ruffin, J., said: "When the Constitution of 1868 was
adopted, whereby all the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity,
and the forms of all such actions and suits, were abolished, it became to be a matter
of imperative necessity that there should be new rules provided for our courts in
regard to the parties to the actions to be thereafter instituted. It was open to the
lawmaking power of the State to have retained either the technical common-law
rules or those that had been adopted by the chancery courts, and which were re-
garded as being more liberal; but, as the two were inconsistent and in many par-
ticulars contradictory, they could not coexist in the same court and be admin-
istered at the same time. Accordingly the provisions of the Code were adopted
which, with a few modifications, are the same with the rules that had prevailed
with the courts of equity; so that these old equity rules are our best guides in
determining the proper parties to actions brought under the Code, and this Court
very early manifested a purpose to adopt them as such." Cf. Glenn v. Farmers
Bank of N. C., 72 N. C. 626 (1875); N. C. Land Co. v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 329
(1873). In the latter (at page 334), the Court referred to the transaction clause
of what is now G. S. 1-123 as perhaps "an imperfect attempt to condense the rule
of equity."
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it would certainly be permitted under the Code.76  Thus it became the
rule that if either pre-Code equity or pre-Code law authorized joinder
the Code would also permit it ;77 and, of course, joinder under the Code
would additionally be permitted when authorized by the statutory lan-
guage, though it was not permitted in pre-Code practice-as joinder of
tort and contract, on the law side, under the transaction clause.78
Acceptance of the equity rules has been of great and lasting impor-
tance under the Code. It is quite true that those rules are frequently
hard to apply, and the Court has conceded more than once that no gen-
eral rule has been or can be adopted with regard to multifariousness. 79
But the very vagueness of the rules has enabled the Court to permit
joinder which might have been prevented by literal interpretation of the
language of the Code provisions-particularly the requirement of G. S.
1-123 that all causes affect all parties.80
The leading pre-Code equity case, upon which the early Code cases
relied for their authority as to the equity rules, is Bedsole v. Monroe.8
There plaintiff alleged that he and defendant were the executors and
chief legatees of an estate; that defendant agreed to undertake active
management of -the estate's affairs; that, by fraud, he induced plaintiff
to convey plaintiff's interest in the estate lands. Relief demanded in-
cluded an-accounting, payment of the legacies, division of the residue
of the estate, and cancellation of the deed. A demurrer for multifarious-
ness was overruled. Chief Justice Ruffin defined multifariousness as
the joining of two or more distinct grounds of suit against the same or
different persons, which existed when there was misjoinder of persons
'7 "We presume that it will hardly be maintained that the effect of the Code,
with its freer and more elastic provisions, has been to prevent the union of parties
plaintiff, when the same was permitted by the common law." Ruffin, J., in State
ex rel. Hoover v. Berryhill, 84 N. C. 133, 137 (1881). The case involved the right
of two (out of five) next of kin to join in suing the sureties on the administrator's
bond, alleging that an accounting had been had in which the share of each plain-
tiff had been fixed. The Court found a precedent for this in State to the use
of Murphy v. McKay, 28 N. C. 397 (1846).
"* The language in the early Code cases, quoted in notes 75 and 76, seems to
deal primarily with joinder of parties, but the facts show that the propriety of
joinder of causes was also at stake. And, indeed, the quotation from the Hoover
case, cited supra note 75, was directed to a demurrer which the Court said it
would treat as a demurrer for misjoinder of causes.
' Cases cited supra notes 44 and 45.
"Ezzell v. Merritt, 224 N. C. 602, 31 S. E. (2d) 751 (1944) ; Craven County
v. The Investment Co., 201 N. C. 523, 160 S. E. 753 (1931) ; Balfour Quarry Co.
v. West Construction Co., 151 N. C. 345, 66 S. E. 217 (1909) ; King v. Farmer,
88 N. C. 22 (1883).
" Of course, the mere fact that equitable relief is sought is not alone a reason
for permitting joinder of causes, involving different parties, apparently unrelated
otherwise. See, e.g., Mills v. N. C. Joint Stock Land Bank, 208 N. C. 674, 182
S. E. 336 (1935), where an unsuccessful attempt was made t join a demand for
the reform of an insurance policy against one defendant with a demand for an
injunction to restrain foreclosure against another. Cf. Simons v. Southern Home
Ins. Co., 203 N. C. 146, 164 S. E. 730 (1932).640 N. C. 313 (1848).
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or subjects of litigation. He pointed out that the objection was usually
based on misjoinder of persons, because one defendant should not have
to submit to delays that might arise between the plaintiff and another
defendant. However, he conceded that, though there were few cases
illustrating it, a single defendant might raise the objection based on
misjoinder of subjects of litigation.
The Chief Justice then employed the phrases which, with or without
minor variations, have ever since rung through the North Carolina cases.
Multifariousness, he said, "can only apply when two things concur:
first, when the different grounds of suit are wholly distinct; and sec-
ond, when each ground would, as stated, sustain a bill. If the grounds
of the bill be not entirely distinct and wholly unconnected; if they arise
out of one and the same transaction or series of transactions, forming
one course of dealing and all tending to one end; if one connected story
can be told of the whole, then the objection cannot apply." 82
Further, he supposed a case in which a former ward sues his guard-
ian, involving several conveyances of the ward's property. He said, "In
such case a bill may be filed in affirmance of the original right of the
plaintiff, and in order that the relief in respect to it-which is the main
relief-may be effectual, the plaintiff may state in his bill any number
of conveyances improperly obtained from him, either at one or more
times or respecting different kinds of property, and ask to have them
all put out of his way or to have reconveyances; for the several con-
veyances do not so much constitute different subjects of litigation, but
are rather so many barricades erected by the defendant to impede the
plaintiff's progress toward his rights."8s Accordingly, the joinder was
sustained.
The case involved a single plaintiff and a single defendant, but the
language used, particularly in the first quotation, can be employed to
fit situations involving multiple parties; and it has frequently been so
employed. Most of the Code cases sustaining joinder in situations
which were at all complicated have justified on the ground that the
complaint related a "connected story."8 4 Subsequent cases have added
a statement that "if the objects of the suit are single, and it happens
that different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which
arise out of the single object, it necessarily follows that such different
32 40 N. C. 313, 317.
8s40 N. C. 313, 317.
84 However, "That a connected story of the several transactions may be told is
not alone sufficient. They must be connected uith the same subjcct of action."
Barnhill, J., in Pressley v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 226 N. C. 518,
519, 39 S. E. (2d) 382, 383 (1946) (a case which also involved only one plaintiff
and one defendant). This distinction is obviously based on the wording of the
transaction clause of G. S. 1-123; but it has not been such a stumbling block to
joinder as the requirement of the same section that all causes affect all parties.
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persons must be brought before the Court in order that the suit may
conclude the whole subject."8a
It remains to examine some types of cases which have been rather
frequently before the Court.
CREDITORS' BILLS
It is firmly established that a creditor may sue his debtor for a
judgment on the debt and, in the same action, ask to have the debtor's
fraudulent conveyances set aside, joining the grantees as parties de-
fendant. This was tentatively permitted as early as 1875,86 and its pro-
priety was clearly affirmed in 1881 in The Dawson Bank v. Harris.81
The Court there recognized that prior to the Code plaintiff would first
have had to secure his judgment and then apply to equity to set aside
the conveyance; but in view of the union of law and equity under the
Code, the Court believed the entire relief could conveniently be granted
in one action and that this conformed to the Code intent to avoid use-
less multiplicity of litigation8s The effect is to allow a judgment
creditor's bill without a judgment.89 The case involved several con-
veyances to different grantees; and, though the grantees had in turn
conveyed to the principal defendant's wife, who was also a party, the
opinion makes it clear that the joinder would have been proper had each
grantee retained such title as he acquired. 0
When there is but one plaintiff, there is a plausible argument that
the requirement that all causes affect all parties is satisfied, whether
there be one conveyance or several. The grantee-defendants are not tech-
nically liable for the demand against the principal defendant for a money
' 5 Young v. Young, 81 N. C. 92, 97 (1879).
'Glenn v. Farmers Bank of N. C., 72 N. C. 626 (1875). The Court inclined
to the opinion that the Code permitted the joinder and sustained the overruling
of the demurrer, but said that the decision was not final, as defendant could have
the benefit of his objections at the trial.
8T84N. C. 206 (1881).
8sThe Court relied in part on McLendon v. The Commissioners of Anson
County, cited supra note 52, holding that the Code permitted demands for money
judgment and for mandamus to be joined in one action.
"'Hancock Bros. & Co. v. Wooten, 107 N. C. 9, 12 S. E. 199, 11 L. R. A. 466
(1890). The rule permitting the demands for money judgment and to set aside
the conveyance to be joined has been expressly written into Rule 18(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
"It was argued that the several defendants were connected with different
transactions, were without community of interest, and that there was no combina-
tion among them. In answering this, Chief Justice Smith said, "The essential
unity of the proceeding consists in the fact that the debtor's own property is alone
sought to be appropriated to his debt. If the conveyances are fraudulent, as for
this purpose the demurrer admits, the title remains in Harris, and never was di-
vested out of him. The aid of the Court is asked to remove a cloud upon the title
by declaring the deeds void, so that the property may be sold under the direction
of the Court and bidders be induced to give the [sic] value for it. The defend-
ants, other than Harris, are made parties because they by their deeds profess to
have had an interest in the subject-matter, and section 61 of the Code requires
they should, in order that they may be concluded by the result, and the adjudfca-
tion be final." 84 N. C. 206, 212. (Section 61 of the Code is present G. S. 1-69.)
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judgment; but, since the fate of their conveyances will depend upon its
outcome, they are certainly "affected" by it. But what if several plain-
tiffs, each with a separate claim, unite in an action for separate money
judgments and to set aside conveyances? All the plaintiffs are inter-
ested in the demand to set aside the conveyances, but is plaintiff A
"affected" by plaintiff B's demand for his money judgment?
If two plaintiffs with independent claims in either contract or tort
attempt to join, without the conveyance feature being present, it is held
to be misjoinder of causes and parties. 1 Addition of the conveyance
feature does not confer on plaintiff A an interest in plaintiff B's basic
claim; nor is plaintiff A's right to have the conveyance set aside affected
in the slightest by plaintiff B's success or failure. Nevertheless, it is
clear enough that the addition of this complication will turn a case of
misjoinder into a case of proper joinder. The right to do so was recog-
nized as early as 1882.02 The rationale is apparently: (1) that judg-
ment creditors could, before the Code, join in demanding that the
debtor's conveyance be set aside;93 and (2) that the Code resulted in
permitting all the relief to be granted in one action, relying on the
Dawson Bank case. The rule is a wholly practical one, as its unbroken
continuation affirms; and it fully justifies whatever technical violence
has been done to the literal language of the joinder of causes statute.
Later cases have not questioned the rule. Not only have one or
more plaintiffs been allowed to sue one principal defendant and his
fraudulent grantees, whether there be one conveyance,04 or several;96
but there may be several principal defendants against whom money
judgment is sought (assuming their joinder on this phase of the case is
proper), and the conveyance to be set aside may be from one such
defendant to another,9 6 or to a third party from all of them acting to-
gether,97 or to a third party from one or more acting independently as
to his own property.03 The principle extends to a case where the prin-
91 Weaver v. Kirby, 186 N. C. 387, 119 S. E. 564 (1923) (implied contract);
Roberts v. Utility Manufacturing Co., 181 N. C. 204, 106 S. E. 664 (1921) (ex-
press contract) ; Sasser v. Bullard, 199 N. C. 562, 155 S. E. 248 (1930) (tort).
'Mebane v. Layton, 86 N. C. 572 (1882).
" For this the Court relied on STORY's EQUITY PLEADING, on cases decided by
other courts, and on Wall v. Fairley, 73 N. C. 464 (1875).
"Wofford-Fain & Co. v. Hampton, 173 N. C. 686, 92 S. E. 612 (1917) ; Ben-
ton v. Collins, 118 N. C. 196, 24 S. E. 122 (1896).
'"LeDuc v. Brandt, 110 N. C. 289, 14 S. E. 778 (1892).
"Robinson v. Williams, 189 N. C. 256, 126 S. E. 621 (1925). Cf. Walker v.
Asheville Building Securities Co., 205 N. C. 165, 170 N. C. 631 (1933).
"Federal Reserve Bank v. Moseley, 202 N. C. 836, 162 S. E. 923 (1932);
Smith v. Summerfield, 108 N. C. 284, 12 S. E. 997 (1891).
"'Virginia Trust Co. v. Pharr Estates, Inc., 206 N. C. 894, 175 S. E. 186
(1934) (deeds of trust to be set aside were void for failure to comply with G. S.
23-2 rather than on ordinary fraud principles) ; Carswell v. Talley, 192 N. C. 37,
133 N. C. 181 (1926) (the deed involved here was made under court order);
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Floyd, 158 N. C. 455, 74 S. E. 465 (1912). See
also Barkley v. McClung Realty Co., 211 N. C. 540, 191 S. E. 3 (1937).
[Vol. 2
PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES
cipal defendant's wife joined him in executing the deed, which included
some property of the wife ;99 to a case in which plaintiff seeks (a) to
set aside the corporate debtor's deed to defendant A and the latter's
deed of trust to defendant B, and (b) a money judgment against de-
fendant C, who had assumed the debts of the corporate debtor ;'oo and
to a case in which plaintiff seeks (a) a money judgment against the
principal defendant, and (b) to set aside the assignment of a judgment
previously obtained by that defendant against present plaintiff in another
action.10 '
The joinder is proper though the demand for relief encompasses
still other things, such as: an injunction restraining sale under the deed
of trust sought to be set aside ;102 to establish the existence of a partner-
ship between defendants ;103 to require foreclosure of a mortgage, the
validity of which was not questioned, so that plaintiff could reach the
surplus remaining;104 to require sums realized by an assignee of the
principal defendants to be applied to plaintiff's claim ;1o5 and to ask for
judgment against the debtor bank's stockholders on their double liabil-
ity contract."0 6
The fact that a single plaintiff grounds his action on an unliquidated
tort claim for assault and battery does not affect the propriety of the
joinder.10 7 No case seems to have involved two or more plaintiffs with
independent, unliquidated tort claims, but it is doubtful that a sound
line could be drawn between tort and contract for this purpose. How-
ever, perhaps this would increase the chance that separate trials would
be ordered under the provisions of G. S. 1-68.
A case having some resemblance to the creditors' bill cases, in that
"0 Hancock Bros. & Co. v. Wooten, cited supra note 89. In Allred v. Robbins,
205 N. C. 823, 172 S. E. 404 (1934), the wife joined in executing the deed, but
the property belonged to the husband alone.Daniels v. Duck Island, Inc., 212 N. C. 90, 193 S. E. 7 (1937).
101 N. C. joint Stock Land Bank v. Kerr, 206 N. C. 610, 175 S. E. 102 (1934).
The purpose of this was to insure that the prior judgment would be used only as
a credit against any judgment obtained by plaintiff in the current action.
1"Daniels v. Duck Island, Inc., cited supra note 100. Comparable is a request
for an injunction restraining a sale under execution on a judgment against plain-
tiff joined with a request to set aside an assignment of the judgment. N. C. Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Kerr, cited supra note 101.
100 Robinson v. Williams, cited supra note 96., LeDuc v. Brandt, cited supra note 95 (the complaint demanded that other
conveyances be set aside). See also Virginia Trust Co. v. Pharr Estates, Inc.,
cited supra note 98, where plaintiffs requested foreclosure of a deed of trust and,
in the same action, requested that deeds for other property given by guarantors be
set aside, alleging that the property covered by plaintiff's deed of trust would not
sell for enough to satisfy the debt secured.
100 Smith v. Summerfield, cited supra note 97.Glenn v. Farmers Bank of N. C., cited supra note 86. However, here the
decision was not final, as defendant was permitted to raise the objection again at
the trial."s Benton v. Collins, cited supra note 94. Cf. Moorefield v. Roseman, 198 N.
C. 805, 153 S. E. 399 (1930). See also Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Floyd,
cited supra note 98.
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plaintiff joins with his request for money judgment a request that equity
aid him in removing a stumbling block to his recovery, is Killian v.
Hanna.08 There plaintiff coupled an action for wrongful death with
a demand that a release, given with respect to the wrongful death claim,
be set aside as fraudulent. The tort feasor's insurer and two of its
agents, allegedly active in securing the release, were joined with the tort
feasor as defendants. The joinder was sustained. The case essentially
represents only an illustration of anticipatory pleading. If omitted
from the complaint, the release allegations could have been introduced
by reply.' °
ESTATE LITIGATION
In litigation involving the assets of an estate, even though compli-
cated as to parties and involving multiple demands for relief, objection
for misjoinder of causes and parties has an excellent chance of being
overruled. In these cases, much reliance is placed on the "connected
story" and "single object" phrases.1"0
Where the litigation is instituted by the creditors of the decedent,
there is obviously much similarity to the creditors' bill cases, though the
demand to set aside conveyances is usually replaced by some other de-
mand designed to reach the estate assets. Thus, an estate receiver, ap-
pointed in a, creditors' suit, joined as defendants the widow-executrix,
her son and two corporations dominated by the son, alleging misman-
agement and dissipation of estate assets and that one of the corporations
was holding such assets which the executrix should recover and admin-
ister for the benefit of creditors. An accounting was demanded of all
the defendants, and perhaps other relief, also."' In another case a
creditor sued the administrators and their surety, the widow, and the
heirs, demanding that the purported final account be set aside and that
plaintiff recover judgment jointly against defendants and individually
against the administrators and their surety.112 In a third case in which
joinder was sustained, the type of relief demanded does not appear.118
..B 193 N. C. 17, 136 S. E. 246 (1927).
' 9Joyner v. P. L. Woodard & Co., 201 N. C. 315, 160 S. E. 288 (1931), where
the lower court was sustained in striking out the release allegations, as no harm
was done by such action. See also Scott v. Bryan, 210 N. C. 478, 187 S. E. 756
(1936).
l Even when the Court found only a single cause of action was involved, it
-still fell back on these phrases. Ricks v. Wilson, 151 N. C. 46, 65 S. E. 614
(1909).
B undy v. Marsh, 205 N. C. 768, 172 S. E. 353 (1934).
" State ex rel. Salisbury Morris Plan Co. v. McCahless, 193 N. C. 200, 136
S. E. 371 (1927). Technically this is not a decision on misjoinder of causes and
parties. The demurrer below did not mention misjoinder of either. In the brief
*on appeal, misjoinder of causes was raised, and the Court considered it briefly,
though it probably had been waived.
11" State ex rel. McCleod v. Maurer, 215 N. C. 795, 2 S. E. (2d) 868 (1939).
The brief per curiam opinion indicates only that the suit was by a creditor against
an administrator, his sureties, and the heirs for the determination of questions
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In the one case in which the creditor clearly sought to set aside a
conveyance a misjoinder of causes and parties was found.114 The at-
tempt was: (1) to surcharge the administrator's final account and recover
from him and his sureties for maladministration; and (2) to set aside,
as fraudulent, a conveyance made by decedent two years before his death
(the administrator and sureties, as individuals, as well as others, being
involved in this and subsequent conveyances allegedly made with knowl-
edge of the fraud). The Court, in a per curiam opinion, said the causes
involved different defendants, were unrelated, and did not set forth a
connected story. The case differs from the ordinary creditors' bill cases
in that plaintiff could win on the fraudulent conveyance cause without
winning on the other." 5
Where the plaintiffs are heirs or next of kin or legatees, and the
litigation is grounded primarily on events transpiring after the dece-
dent's death," 8e the joinder has usually been sustained. As already pointed
out, two next of kin may join in suing the sureties on the administrator's
bond, alleging that the distributive share of each plaintiff had already
been fixed by an accounting." 7 The Court sustained this though three
other next of kin were not joined.
Most of the other cases of this type are considerably more compli-
cated, though the basic idea is always to secure the plaintiffs' share of
the estate assets. As long as all the relief sought is directly connected
with that objective, and as long as there is a central, unifying thread-
such as the provisions of a trust or agreement or will, or misapplication
of funds by the principal defendants (with which the other defendants
are somewhat connected)-the joinder will probably be sustained."18
involved in the settlement of the estate. The demurrer for misjoinder of causes
and parties was overruled on the authority of two cases involving estate litigation
instituted by heirs or distributees.
R'I. L. Vollers Co. v. Todd, 212 N. C. 677, 194 S. E. 84 (1937).
"sCf. Daniels v. Duck Island, Inc., cited supra note 100.
11 Cases grounded on fraud practiced on the decedent prior to his death are
dealt with below under "Other Fraud Cases.'
" State ex" rel. Hoover v. Berryhill, cited supra note 76.
Ezzell v. Merritt, 224 N. C. 602, 31 S. E. (2d) 751 (1944) (heirs of B sue
M, alleging one plaintiff borrowed money from B's estate, giving note and mort-
gage on her share of realty, payable to G, a deceased executor of B, individually;
that this plaintiff then conveyed to M, who promised to pay the debt to B's heirs;
that plaintiffs possess the mortgage and note and will surrender them upon pay-
ment. The administrator d. b. n. c. t. a. of B was made a plaintiff and the ad-
ministrator of G a defendant. The lower court then sustained a demurrer for
misjoinder of causes and parties, but the Supreme Court reversed, saying, inter
alia, that there was but a single cause of action against M) ; Bellman v. Bissette,
222 N. C. 72, 21 S. E. (2d) 896 (1942) (P, prior to death, conveyed land to one
daughter and her husband, they agreeing in writing to care for P and his wife,
take certain compensation and, upon the death of P and -wife, convey to all P's
children share and share alike. After death of P and wife, they conveyed one
tract to husband of another daughter, and he in turn conveyed to a trustee to
secure a loan. The other children of P, having received nothing, sue both daugh-
ters and their husbands, the trustee and the lender. They demand enforcement
of the trust, conveyance of the land, and an accounting. Held, proper joinder,
1946]
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The "connected story" and similar phrases are likely to be invoked to
permit it. If, however, anything regarded by the Court as a completely
independent transaction is introduced, or if the relief sought is in part
not necessarily connected with the estate assets, misjoinder may be
found.
An illustration is found in the case of Robertson v. Robertson.110
R left a will stating that if any of his children owed debts to other
children, the debts should be a charge on the debtor's share of the land
(except in the case of debtor-daughters), and the debtor's share of per-
sonalty should be applied on the debts. Plaintiff was a creditor child
and also executor. He sued in both capacities, joining as defendants
the other living children of R, the children of a deceased son, and the
husbands of two of R's daughters. He requested determination of the
amount of the debts and, presumably, invocation of the will provision in
collecting them. The Court, in general, approved the joinder, saying:
"The allegations in the complaint as to the indebtedness of the several
defendants relate to the same subject matter and involve the rights of
the parties under the quoted provisions of the will of a common an-
cestor."'1  However, it found the attempted joinder of the two hus-
bands improper. Conceding that their joinder would be only surplusage
if the debts involved were debts of their wives alone, the Court never-
theless construed an allegation that each daughter and her husband
were indebted, with prayer for judgment against both, as indicating that
debts for which the husbands were personally liable were involved.
Apparently this made it a misjoinder, since the debts of the husbands
were not covered by the will provisions and the situation, as between
them and the rest of the defendants, became simply an attempt to sue
different defendants on independent debts.1
2 '
though there were separate allegations of waste against the different defendants);
Leach v. Page, 211 N. C. 622, 191 S. E. 349 (1937) (Plaintiffs, distributees of L,
sued P, as administrator of L and individually, alleging he had estate funds, for
which he had not accounted, which he invested through a partnership of which he
was a member and for which the partnership gave notes. This partnership and
an interlocking one were alleged to be subsidiaries of a defunct bank and the
latter, or its liquidating agent, was alleged to hold assets of the partnership which
plaintiffs were entitled to have applied on the debt. Defendants, in addition to P,
were P's surety, the members of the two partnerships, the bank, its liquidating
agent, and the Commissioner of Banks. Supreme Court reversed the order sustain-
ing demurrer for misjoiner of causes and parties). See also Shaffer v. Bank, 201
N. C. 415, 160 S. E. 481 (1931) ; Taylor v. Postal Life Ins. Co., 182 N. C. 120,
108 S. E. 502 (1921) ; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C. 313 (1848).
19 215 N. C. 562, 2 S. E. (2d) 552 (1939).
120 215 N. C. 562, 564, 2 S. E. (2d) 552, 553 (1939).
121 Though the situation was one -which, if it involved misjoinder at all, would
ordinarily be branded misjoinder of both causes and parties, and the demurrer was
for both, the Court in its opinion refers expressly only to misjoinder of causes. It
did not dismiss the entire proceeding. Normally the consequence of misjoinder of
causes is division of the action. However, the Court did not order this, but sim-
ply sustained the demurrer as to the husbands only, making it probable that the
action was dismissed against the husbands only.
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Assuming, as the Court found, that the credit of the husbands was
involved, it still seems probable that their liability was joint and several
with their wives, or at least several "upon the same obligation" within
the meaning of G. S. 1-71. Application of the wives' shares of the
personalty to the debts would operate to reduce or discharge the amount
otherwise payable from the husbands' property. It is thus arguable that
the husbands were "affected" by the will provisions as well as the other
defendants. The case thus possibly represents the most technical ap-
proach the Court has made in the estate cases; but, on the whole, it has
adopted a broad viewpoint on joinder in this field and the results have
been satisfactory.
CORPORATE MISMANAGEMENT CASES
Though the facts in such cases are usually quite complicated, when
the receiver or liquidating agent of a corporation sues its officers, direc-
tors or stockholders for mismanagement of the corporate business, the
action is likely to withstand any objection raised on the ground of mis-
joinder of causes and parties. While some stress has been laid on facts
which virtually show a conspiracy or common design between the de-
fendants,122 it is probable that any showing that all defendants actually
participated in the wrongdoing is sufficient.1'2 The defendants in these
cases are essentially liable as joint tort feasors, and in connection with
other types of torts it is sufficient, to make the defendants joint tort
feasors, to show that their actions united to produce a single injury,
even though they were clearly not acting in concert or pursuant to a
22Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Peirce, 195 N. C. 717, 718, 143 S. E. 524
(1 2 ) he C utdistnguihed aes, rlied on b y the 
defendant, because of the
complaint' aleain f a geeal core of dealing and systemai oiyowrongdoing, concealment and mismanagement, virtu lly amounting to a conspiracy,in which the defendants are all charged with having participated at different times
and in varying degrees." Cf. Hood ex tel. Commercial Bank and Trust Co. v.
Love, 203 N. C. 583, 166 S. E.743, 744 (1932) : "Where, in an action brought
by the Commissioner of Banks against directors of a bank for damages on accountof negligent mismanagement, the complaint enumerates in detail negligent acts andomissions of the defendants and alleges that such acts and omissions constitute a
general course of dealing and systematic policy of neglect, wrongdoing, and mis-
management, in which all defendants participated, and that such negligence proxi-
mately caused great losses to the bank, is the complaint demurrable? We think
not."
12 Sooo .Bts ..- 31 1,2 .. 478 405A. St e.
comte by difrn deedns but tha th defendants action ohtm
and the averment of a common design or conspiracy is unnecessary." The action
was brought by a hank depositor rather than a receiver, but the principle shouldbe the same. A more serious point is that the quotation is susceptible of the inter-
pretation that the Court thought the facts alleged showed a conspiracy or common
design, and was saying only that the pleader did not whave to append the express
characterization. However, though the joinder question was not at issue, theproposition that directors may be liable as joint tort feasors, even in the absence
of conspiracy or common design seems to he sustained by Minnis v. Sharpe, 198
N. C. 364, 151 5. E. 735 (1930), same case 202 N. C. 300, 162 5. E. 606 (1932),and 203 N C. e110, 164 1 . C. 625 (1932).
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common design. 124 Of course, conspiracy or common design becomes a
legitimate necessity when, without it, the activities of different defend-
ants are so diverse as to time and place as apparently to give rise to
entirely separate injuries.
When the only relief sought is a money judgment for the misman-
agement, the joint tort feasor approach could result in labeling the whole
proceeding as a single cause of action, 25 but the decisions have appar-
ently not rested on this ground.
The addition of a demand to set aside a conveyance by one of the
defendants (a typical creditors' bill feature) does not result in a mis-
joinder ;126 and the joinder has been sustained even where the Court
possibly regarded the causes as to some extent inconsistent'
27
However, in two cases the plaintiff receiver has been guilty of error.
In one it was not very serious. There the complaint included allegations
that the defendants received bank deposits knowing the bank to be in-
solvent. Holding that only injured depositors could sue on that ground,
the Court said it could be stricken on motion, but the remainder of the
action was not affected.1
28
In another bank case the receiver attempted to sue: (1) the direc-
tors, for negligence prior to merger, resulting in insolvency; and (2)
the successor bank, alleging breach of its contract with the directors
regarding liquidation of assets. This was held to be dual misjoinder,
the Court stressing the fact that there was no allegation of conspiracy
or its equivalent--"a general and continued course or dealing, or of a
systematic policy of wrongdoing, participated in by all the defend-
ants."' 2 In the light of the requirement that each cause affect all
parties, the insistence here on conspiracy or its equivalent is legitimate.
Even if it be assumed that the breach of contract was also a tort (thus
eliminating the necessity of satisfying the transaction clause of G. S.
1-123), the allegations as stated do not show independent acts producing
a single injury, but such acts producing separate injuries.
The same general principles apply where a creditor is permitted by
1, Lineberger v. City of Gastonia, 196 N. C. 445, 146 S. E. 79 (1929).
... This might run into logical difficulties in a case like Branch Banking and
Trust Co. v. Peirce, cited supra note 122, where the allegations covered a period
of seven years and not all the defendants had been officers or directors for the
entire period. Here the "systematic policy .. .virtually amounting to a con-
spiracy" may appeal to the Court as a convenient thread on which to hang the
joinder, but the respective defendants were hardly in on the policy except while
serving as officers or directors. The Court, by calling attention to what was done
in Long v. Swindell, 77 N. C. 176 (1877), possibly implies that differing amounts
of damages could be assessed against the several defendants.
Carswell v. Talley, 192 N. C. 37. 133 S. E. 181 (1926).
Shuford v. Yarbrough, 198 N. C. 5, 141 S. E. 343 (1929). The facts given
are not sufficient to permit determination of what the causes were or how they
might have been inconsistent.a Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Peirce, cited supra note 122.
Grady v. Warren. 201 N. C. 693, 694, 161 S. E. 319 (1931).
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the substantive law to sue officers, directors or stockholders. Thus, no
misjoinder was found when a depositor sued bank directors and, on the
same basic allegations of mismanagement, joined causes of action for
negligence in conducting the bank's affairs and for wrongfully inducing
the plaintiff to deposit his money by misrepresenting the bank's sol-
vency.130 On the other hand, the Court has several times found that
suits by creditors involve entirely independent causes of action, with
different parties affected, without any showing of common design or
concurrence of wrongdoing resulting in a single injury. Thus it is mis-
joinder of causes and parties when numerous creditors sue, the com-
plaint embracing "a suit by creditors against the original stockholders
for unpaid balances due on their original subscriptions; second, a suit
by such creditors against three other defendants alleged to be in control
of the property and goods of the corporation, claiming same as owners
for fraudulent dissipation of these assets; third, suits by certain indi-
vidual creditors against still other defendants on a separate demand or
claim against the latter.. ."131 Similarly, when a defendant claimed
he had made payment of a note (on which plaintiff sues) to a bank
president, who falsely represented that the note had been lost or mis-
placed, the Court dismissed his cross-claim because of joinder of: (1)
demand for recovery against the bank's receiver for the president's
fraud; (2) demand for judgment against the president personally; and
(3) demand for judgment against the officers and directors for permit-
ting an insolvent bank to remain open.13 2 The Court regarded the de-
mands against the receiver, on the one hand, and against the officers and
directors, on the other, as distinct causes of action, one in contract and
the other in tort, against different defendants.
In the remaining corporate mismanagement cases, the plaintiffs were
stockholders. In one of these a receiver had been appointed for the
corporation. The preferred stockholders intervened, had the directors
made defendants, and sued: (1) to earmark assets in the receiver's
hands as a sinking fund for the benefit of the preferred; (2) on behalf
180 Caldwell v. Bates, 118 N. C. 323, 24 S. E. 481 (1896); Solomon v. Bates,
118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896); Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482
(1896) (connected cases). See also Craven County v. The Investment Co., 201
N. C. 523, 160 S. E. 753 (1931), a case with very complicated facts involving a
loan by a county to help effect reorganization of a bank which became insolvent.
Joinder was sustained.
"I Beckey Clothing Co. v. Green, 187 N. C. 772, 122 S. E. 847 (1924). See
also Lucas and Lewis v. N. C. Bank and Trust Co., 206 N. C. 909, 174 S. E. 230
(1934). There it does not positively appear whether plaintiffs were stockholders
or creditors, though they were probably the latter. It was held misjoinder of
causes and parties to join: "(1) alleged contract breaches and (2) torts com-
mitted on the part of the corporate defendant, and (3) alleged neglect of official
duties and (4) torts committed by the Commissioner of Banks." No other facts
are given in the brief per curiam opinion.
.. The Citizens National Bank of Baltimore v. Angelo Brothers, 193 N. C.
576. 137 S. E. 705 (1927).
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of the receiver against the directors for negligence and misapplication
of funds in failing to add to the sinking fund in named years; and (3)
directly against the directors, based on the same allegations as in (2),
for any amount not realized by (1) and (2) .13 The Court said the
joinder was proper, though the principal battle was over the propriety
of a reference, and it is not clear that any proper objection to joinder
was made. If it can be regarded as good authority on the joinder ques-
tion, it seems, on the surface, in conflict with the bank case summarized
in the preceding paragraph. However, in that case the Court was un-
doubtedly strongly influenced by the feeling that the defendant, with his
new parties and cross-claim, should not be allowed unduly to complicate
the controversy between himself and plaintiff.13 ' In this case, while
the controversy was also technically a new one introduced into the frame-
work of a pending action, it was for practical purposes an entirely inde-
pendent proceeding.
There are several other stockholder cases in which the joinder was
held to be proper.13 5 However, the Court drew the line in Summit Mills,
Inc. v, Summit Yarn Co.'3 6 The basic allegations were that B agreed
to form a new corporation which would buy plaintiff's property for
$85,000 and one-fourth of its stock; that, after this was done, B (also a
corporation), through identical officers and control of the stock, mis-
managed the new corporation and made it insolvent; that B failed to pay
what it promised to pay for its stock in the new corporation; that B
misrepresented the facts as to this; and that plaintiff had been deprived
of information regarding the new corporation. Suing B and the new
corporation, plaintiff demanded a money judgment against both, a stat-
utory audit of the new corporation, a receivership, and preference for
""Fry v. Pomona Mills, Inc., 206 N. C. 768, 175 S. E. 156 (1934).
"~' Defendant's answer also alleged that plaintiff held the note as collateral, that
plaintiff also held other collateral, and demanded that the other collateral be first
exhausted. Chief justice Stacy said: "This case presents a striking illustration of
the wisdom of the rule established by these decisions. If the plaintiff hold the
note in suit only as collateral, and the remaining collateral held by it be amply
sufficient, as alleged, to discharge its obligation, then the bringing into this suit of
the other defendants would seem to be wholly unnecessary." 193 N. C. 576, 578,
137 S. E. 705, 706 (1927).
135 Ayers v. Bailey, 162 N. C. 209, 78 S. E. 66 (1913). Eight plaintiffs, stock-
holders of a bank, sued three defendants, who were stockholders and officers,
alleging defendants wrongfully took worthless paper and then induced plaintiffs
to guarantee it when it was transferred as part of a merger deal, the defendants
promising to join in the guarantee, which they failed to do. While the Court
found two causes of action--one on the alleged contract to guarantee and one for
mismanagement-the joinder was held proper as involving transactions connected
with the same subject of action; Worth v. Knickerbocker Trust Co., 152 N. C.
242, 67 S. E. 590 (1910) (two judges dissented on the ground there should be a
repleader to state clearly the one cause of action they believed to be involved);
Oyster v. Mining Co., 140 N. C. 135, 52 S. E. 198 (1905) (special concurring
opinion by two judges). For a case, sustaining joinder, involving some elements
of mismanagement, but where control of the corporation was the real issue, see
Corbett v. Hilton Lumber Co., 223 N. C. 704, 28 S. E. (2d) 250 (1943).
1 223 N. C. 479, 27 S. E. (2d) 289 (1943).
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its claims over any claims of B against the new corporation. The Court
said there were at least two causes which were legally unrelated and did
not each affect all parties: (1) against B, for breach of its contract to
pay for the stock-on which the new corporation could not be liable;
and (2) the audit, which could not be asserted against B. It further
said that the misrepresentation allegations affected only B.
This seems an unnecessarily technical decision. In view of the con-
trol allegations, virtually making the new corporation the alter ego of
B, the case seems to present a "connected story" and a common design
within the meaning of the cases previously discussed. And it is very
difficult to see why, in any practical sense, both defendants are not
affected by each cause. In fact, the whole proceeding could easily be
treated as one cause of action, with the request for the audit regarded
as one for purely incidental relief. It seems reasonably clear that the
philosophy underlying many of the earlier cases would have justified
the joinder here.
OTHER FRAUD CASES
It is already apparent that fraud is valuable, though not infallible,
cement for joining causes and parties. It is a usual feature in the
creditors' bill cases, though there it is not directly related to plaintiffs'
basic claims. It is frequently found in the estate and corporate man-
agement cases. And when the Court speaks of conspiracy or common
design as justifying the joinder of multiple defendants, fraud or some-
thing very close to it is almost inevitably involved.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in situations other than those
already discussed, when fraud is the gravamen of the complaint, the
plaintiff may ordinarily join as defendants all those who participated in
the fraud or knowingly profited by it, and may ask for such relief as
necessary to overcome the fraud and enforce his rights. The fact that
the fraud may involve a number of transactions or different properties
does not prevent the joinder if the allegations connect them as parts of
a continuing scheme. Thus, it has been held that the heirs of a decedent
may sue the persons who, over a long period of years, and in various
types of business deals, fraudulently bilked the decedent of his property,
joining as defendants other persons who, with knowledge, took some
of the property.137 The joinder has also been sustained where the al-
leged fraud was practiced in part on the decedent and in part by the
... Fisher v. Trust Co., 138 N. C. 224, 50 S. E. 659 (1905). The facts of the
case were exceptionally complicated, and the decision was by a three to two vote.
The opinions contain lengthy reviews of earlier cases. Judge Walker, one of the
dissenters in the case, subsequently recognized that "the principle of that case has
since been thoroughly settled." Lee v. Thornton, 171 N. C. 209, 214, 88 S. E. 232,
234 (1916) (also a case involving fraud practiced on the ancestor). See also
Young v. Young, 81 N. C. 92 (1879).
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administrator after decedent's death, where the allegations made it ap-
pear that each phase was a part of one original plan.138
In one case the Court found misjoinder of causes and parties where,
according to the Court, the complaint alleged: (1) breach of contract
against two defendants, on which the other defendants were not liable;
(2) tort against two defendants, in which the other defendants were
not interested; and (3) conspiracy against all the defendants.'" It does
not appear from the meagre facts stated whether the first two causes
involved facts which could have been considered as part of the con-
spiracy alleged in the third.140
Some of the land title cases also involve fraud, but it is more con-
venient to deal with them in connection with the other land title cases.
CASES INVOLVING SEVERAL TRACTS OF LAND
Where the object of the suit is to recover possession of several tracts
of land,141 there is a misjoinder of causes and parties if one or more
plaintiffs, 142 or defendants, 14 or both,'144 are not interested in all tracts.
(This should be distinguished from a situation where a plaintiff or de-
fendant with no apparent interest in any of the land is joined, as there
I 8 Daniels v. Baxter, 120 N. C. 14, 26 S. E. 635 (1897). For other fraudulent
scheme cases, see Griggs v. Griggs, 218 N. C. 574, 11 S. E. (2d) 878 (1940);
Cotten v. Laurel Park Estates, Inc., 195 N. C. 848, 141 S. E. 339 (1928) (facts
not given, but per curiam opinion, sustaining joinder, indicates there were three
causes of action connected by "a common scheme, or plot, practically a conspir-
acy"). See also Taylor v. Taylor, 197 N. C. 197, 148 S. E. 171 (1927) (Wife sued
for alimony without divorce, joined husband's father as a defendant, and demanded
the setting aside of: (1) a deed of separation allegedly secured by fraud and
coercion; and (2) an allegedly fraudulent deed from husband to his father. Con-
spiracy between the two defendants was alleged. After answer, defendants de-
murred ore tenuv for misjoinder of causes. Joinder sustained. Decision rested on
"general scheme" and "connected story" rather than on waiver by failure to demur
at the proper time.).""9 Williams v. Gooch, 206 N. C. 330, 173 S. E. 342 (1934).140 Cf. N. C. Land Co. v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 329 (1873), where the Court denied
the right to join what it interpreted as a cause of action for breach of contract
against B with a cause for fraud against B and C, even though it was clear that
the contract allegations, which were not stated as a separate cause in the complaint,
were simply one part of the fraud allegations. However, the case is rather doubt-
ful authority, as the Court seemed also of the view, since clearly rejected, that
contract and tort could not be joined even when they arose from the same
transaction.
... What constitutes a "tract" of land, while usually not a troublesome question,
is not always free from difficulty. See Edgerton v. Powell, 72 N. C. 64 (1875).
The case involved misjoinder of causes only, but the Court dealt with the two
moieties in the same land as different tracts, apparently because there were dif-
ferent chains of title.... Rogers v. Rogers, 192 N. C. 50, 133 S. E. 184 (1926).
"' Burleson v. Burleson, 217 N. C. 336, 7 S. E. (2d) 706 (1940).
" Holland v. Whittington, 215 N. C. 330, 1 S. E. (2d) 813 (1939). Tech-
nically, because of the way the misjoinder question was presented in this case,
there is no decision that one suit could not include the two tracts involved. How-
ever, the Court stressed the different relation of the parties to the two tracts; and
it is apparent, anyway, that if lack of community of interest of plaintiffs or de-
fendants will constitute misjoinder, there is bound to be misjoinder when it is
lacking as to both.
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his joinder can be treated simply as surplusage' 45 ) This principle has
been applied to tax foreclosure actions when all defendants were not
claimants to all the tracts,1 46 and to a suit for the recovery of the-value
of separate tracts, when plaintiffs could not all share in the recovery on
all the tracts.147
However, such a joinder may be permissible if the Court finds some
over-all right of the plaintiffs, recognition or rejection of which will de-
termine the outcome of the whole case. Thus, where tracts originally
owned independently by H and W were included in a deed of trust
executed by them jointly, and the suit was grounded on their alleged
rights under a parol agreement made by H, on behalf of himself and
W, with the trustee, the joinder was proper.148  Similarly, the joinder
was sustained where twenty-one plaintiffs, claiming as remaindermen
under the will of T, sued nineteen defendants who claimed under various
deeds from one who, plaintiffs alleged, was only a life tenant' 49 The
case involved sixteen adjoining tracts lying in two counties. In this
latter case the objection raised went only to joinder of causes; and the
Court seemed to regard the entire proceeding as involving but one
cause.'5 0 It is arguable that the same is true in the first case; but the
Court, in a very brief opinion, by citing the joinder of causes section,
at least intimates to the contrary.
In some cases, where several tracts, legal title to which is currently
in different persons, are all affected by the same fraudulent scheme,
joinder is proper. The fraud, as usual, is a cementing factor. Thus,
it was held proper joinder where the complaint alleged that defendants
L and T, by fraud and undue influence, procured separate conveyances
from plaintiff's ancestor to defendant T and defendant M, who took
", See the discussion under "Joinder of Parties"; and see Moore County v.
Burns, 224 N. C. 700, 32 S. E. (2d) 225 (1944)."" Moore County v. Bums, cited supra note 145.
""7 Green v. Jones, 208 N. C. 221, 179 S. E. 662 (1935). The principle also
has been applied to partition proceedings. Simpson v. Wallace, 83 N. C. 477
(1880).
1"8 Cole v. Shelton, 194 N. C. 741, 140 S. E. 734 (1927). Stacy, C. J., said (at
page 742) : "It is sufficient to say that the rights of all the parties are dependent
upon the establishment or nonestablishment of the alleged parol trust, which grows
out of a single agreement, if made at all, affecting all three tracts of land.' The
opinion also "observed" that the action was one cognizable only in equity.
"' Thames v. Jones, 97 N. C. 121, 1 S. E. 692 (1887). After the case had been
pending for seven.years and parties on each side had died, the Superior Court
ordered the remaining plaintiffs and defendants to prosecute and defend for all
those having similar interests. This action was held proper because the situation
was appropriate for a class suit and because, as to plaintiffs, one or more tenants
in common may sue for possession of real estate without joining the others.
"" "It is true that the plaintiffs allege title under the will of Joseph Thames,
and the defendants claim conveyance from John T. Gilmore, but these are un-
necessary statements of the chain of title relied on by the plaintiffs and defendants
respectively, and are not alleged as causes of action." 97 N. C. 121, 126, 1 S. E.
692, 694.
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with knowledge.151  However, in Green v. Jones,1 52 a different result
was reached. There it was alleged that defendants "wrongfully pro-
cured" title, from G and his wife, to a tract which G owned individually
and a tract which G and wife owned by the entirety. G having died,
the wife, individually and as administratrix, and G's heirs sued to re-
cover the value of the land. In a per curiam opinion, misjoinder of
causes and parties was found because the heirs had no interest in the
tract held by the entirety and there was, therefore, no community of
interest between the plaintiffs.153 The case does not describe the wrong-
ful conduct of the defendants, individually or collectively, but the de-
cision was not made to turn on any non-participation by the defendants
in a common scheme. 154 It was the joinder of the plaintiffs which was
fatal.
Perhaps a distinction must be taken here between tort and contract.
As pointed out subsequently, two plaintiffs claiming injury by virtue of
breach of a single contract are, at times at least, allowed to join though
their interests are not truly joint; whereas two plaintiffs claiming in-
jury by virtue of a single tortious act ordinarily cannot join. Thus, in
the parol agreement case, H and W could join because, though the
agreement was made by H alone, it was for the benefit of both as he
was acting for himself and W. But fraud, while it may give sufficient
community of interest, among the defendants, may not alone supply it
for the plaintiffs. Where there are multiple plaintiffs, they apparently
need some shared interest in the property, as where they would be ten-
ants in common of all the tracts involved.
For purposes of the land tract cases, "It is a well established rule
that a number of trespassers, who have settled upon different parts of
one tract of land, or upon several, that are contiguous and have been
consolidated by the owner of them into one body, may be sued in a single
suit brought by the latter to recover possession and have the title
adjudicated."' 55
""Lee v. Thornton, 171 N. C. 209, 88 S. E. 232 (1916) (there was also a
conveyance to plaintiff, allegedly made to embarrass him). See also Fisher v.
Trust Co., cited supra note 137.
152208 N. C. 221, 179 S. E. 662 (1935).
... The opinion also points out, and possibly relies on the fact that the wife,
as administratrix, would have no interest in the realty of her husband in the ab-
sence of an allegation that personal property was insufficient to pay debts, and also
had no interest in the tract held by the entirety. However, this would seem at
most to make the administratrix an unnecessary party, joinder of whom would be
harmless surplusage. Her presence should not affect the propriety of joinder of
causes and parties unless she did allege insufficient personalty, in which case she
would show an interest in one of the tracts, but not the other.
1" Fraud on the part of some defendants, not participated in by the others,
affecting only one of two tracts, clearly will not justify joinder. Holland v. Whit-
tington, cited supra note 144.
.. Bryan v. Spivey, 106 N. C. 95, 99, 11 S. E. 510 (1890). See also Weeks
v. McPhail, 128 N. C. 134, 38 S. E. 292 (1901). Cf. Love v. Wilbourn, 27 N. C.
344 (1845) ; Needham v. Branson, 27 N. C. 426 (1845). It seems probable that, in
some of the cases where misjoinder has been found, an argument for plaintiff, that
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DEMANDS TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND
FOR OTHER RELIEF
When the main object of the suit is recovery of the possession of
property, and plaintiff has equitable title only, he may join a demand
for a conveyance of the legal title, or for a declaration that he holds
legal title, with the demand for possession. And this is true though, for
purposes of the first demand, he joins a defendant who is not directly
affected by the demand for possession. Thus it was proper joinder
where plaintiff alleged that he purchased land at execution sale, but the
sheriff's deed was lost before registration, and joined the sheriff and
occupant as defendants. 56 Similarly, when plaintiff purchased land
through an agent of M, who received the money, but the deed was
signed by the agent instead of M, it was proper to join M and the occu-
pant as defendants, litigate the first question with M and then try the
ejectment issue with the occupant.
157
In another case it was alleged that J deeded land to plaintiff's an-
cestor, who died without registering the deed; and that, after his death,
J procured the deed and destroyed it and conveyed the land to others.
It was held proper for plaintiff, in his ejectment action, to join as de-
fendants J, the then legal title holder, and intermediate owners. 158
These cases clearly bring out the fact that, since the adoption of the
Code, the owner of equitable title may, in many cases, bring ejectment
without going into equity first to secure legal title.159
Two other cases of this general type, 6 0 which involve further com-
plications, are discussed below under "Alternative Joinder."
the tracts are contiguous and have been consolidated by the common owner, has
been overlooked."' McMillan v. Edwards, 75 N. C. 81 (1876). Objection to misjoinder was
waived, but Court said the joinder was proper under the transaction clause. The
sheriff had professed his willingness to execute another deed. It was probably
unnecessary to make him a defendant at all; and even with him present, the whole
case should probably be regarded as one cause of action.
15 Phoebe v. Black, 76 N. C. 379 (1877). Actually, plaintiff attempted to join
M as party plaintiff, but the Court said this was improper and suggested that the
proper procedure would be as stated in the text.
""Jennings v. Reeves, 101 N. C. 447, 7 S. E. 897 (1888). The joinder question
was not expressly raised, but the Court approved joinder in overruling the defend-
ant's objection that the original deed could not be proved by parol evidence in an
ejectment action.
... See MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIvIL CASES
(1929 ed.) §211(2).
"" Heggie v. Hill, 95 N. C. 303 (1886), and Young v. Young, 81 N. C. 92
(1879). See also Ingram v. Corbit, 177 N. C. 319, 99 S. E. 18 (1919) (tenant
joined administratrix, widow, and heir of landlord in action grounded on breach
of lease, asking for possession against widow and heir, that allotment of widow's
dower be declared void, and for damages) ; Fields v. Brown, 160 N. C. 295, 76
S. E. 8 (1912) (plaintiff joined a cause against A and B for possession of a horse
with a cause for fraud or false warranty against A alone) ; England v. Garner,
86 N. C. 366 (1882) (plaintiffs sued to set aside partition sale of which they
alleged they had no notice, to set aside deed given by one of the purchasers at the
sale, for possession, for rents, profits and damages, and for an injunction against
waste).
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DEMANDS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF A LIEN AND OTHER RELIEF
It is quite clear that a demand for foreclosure of a mortgage can be
joined with a demand for judgment on the debt secured by the mort-
gage. 0 The fact that the persons liable on the debt and those in pos-
session of the property are not the same persons does not render the
joinder improper.6 2 And even where the factual situation was very
complicated, when the Court described the action as one on a note and
for foreclosure of a deed of trust, the joinder was sustained."
The same rules probably apply to any action to enforce a lien, at
least where all the defendants having an interest in the property took
with actual or constructive notice of the lien. In fact, even if they had
no such notice, that would seem to be more in the nature of a defense
to the action than an objection to joinder. The creditors' bill cases ob-
viously lend some support to this thesis. And in Outland v. Out-
land,""' plaintiff alleged that O's will devised lands to two of his sons,
subject to a charge for support of his third son; and that plaintiff
maintained the third son upon agreement of the other two to pay for the
maintenance. The complaint asked for judgment against the two sons
... Credle v. Ayers, 126 N. C. 11, 35 S. E 128 (1900).
116N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-123, last paragraph; McINTosH, NORTH CAR-
OLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIV. CASES (1929 ed.) §431.
"'Marshville Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Maslin, 195 N. C. 12, 141 S. E. 348 (1928).
Original transaction was agreement for a land trade between N and C. When C
was unable to clear debts on its land, N, at C's request, transferred his land to M.
M and wife executed a note to B and deed of trust to E, and conveyed the land to
C. B endorsed the note to N, who endorsed it, without recourse, to plaintiff. C
(through its receiver), B, N, M and wife, E, and several persons whose interests
did not appear were made defendants. The Court relied upon the "connected
story" doctrine and the transaction clause of G. S. 1-123. No mention was made
of the last paragraph of that section, dealing especially with mortgage foreclosures,
nor of the provision of the section excepting mortgage foreclosures from the re-
quirement that all causes affect all parties.
See al~o King v. Farmer, 88 N. C. 22 (1883). Plaintiffs were trustees, for
.themselves and others, as members of a joint stock company, holding title to land.
F contracted to buy the land, plaintiffs retaining title as security. They sued the
other cestuis and F, alleging that F had paid to plaintiffs only the first installment,
but claimed to have made other payments to other cestuis in amounts unknown to
plaintiffs. They demanded an accounting of the payments and of rents and profits,
judgment against F for the balance of the purchase price, sale of the land if F
was unable to pay it, and that the trust be closed out and distribution ordered.
Joinder was sustained.
In Virginia Trust Co. v. Pharr Estates, Inc., cited supra note 98, the fore-
closure was combined with a creditors' bill. There bondholders and the trustee
in a deed of trust given to secure the bonds joined as plaintiffs against: (1) the
principal debtor; (2) guarantors of principal and interest; (3) a guarantor of
interest and taxes; and (4) the trustees and cestuis under deeds of trust given
by several of the guarantors. Plaintiffs demanded foreclosure, but alleged the
land would not bring enough to satisfy the debt and so demanded, also, that the
deeds of trust given by the guarantors be set aside so that plaintiffs would be in
better position to collect their deficiency judgment. Joinder was sustained. Cf.
Walker v. Asheville Building Securities Co., 205 N. C. 165, 170 S. E. 631 (1933),
where the complaint demanded foreclosure of a deed of trust and the setting aside
of a tax foreclosure sale.
-44 113 N. C. 74, 18 S. E. 72 (1893).
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and that the judgment be declared a charge on the land; and purchasers
of part of the land from the two sons were made defendants. The trial
judge sustained a demurrer for misjoinder of causes, but the Supreme
Court reversed. Misjoinder of parties was not expressly raised, but
the Court relied on the "connected story" cases.
It has also been held that a conditional seller of personal property
may unite a demand for the purchase price with a demand for recovery
of the property (for the purpose of foreclosure), joining as defendants
the debtor and another who is in possession. 68
The Federal Land Bank of Columbia v. Jones'8 8 involved joinder of
an entirely different kind of demand with a demand to foreclose a mort-
gage. After giving the mortgage to plaintiff, the mortgagor conveyed
an easement to T permitting it to ppnd water on the land, and T trans-
ferred the easement to P. Plaintiff alleged that the resultant ponding
greatly lessened his security and demanded damages on that score, as
well as foreclosure. The defendants (mortgagor, T and P) did not
raise the question of joinder as such, but contended that the damage
action would not accrue until foreclosure was had and a deficiency re-
sulted. The Court rejected this and also said the joinder of causes was
proper.
GENERAL CONTRACT AND TORT PRINCIPLES
So far as multiple defendants are concerned, it is clear enough that
plaintiff may (possibly excepting completely unrelated breaches) or-
dinarily sue A and B for breach of the same contract ;1 7 or may join
them in action for breaches of two different contracts where both are
liable on both contracts. 6s On the other hand, plaintiff may not join
causes for breaches of separate contracts if one or more defendants are
not liable on each contract.16 9 Thus it was a misjoinder of causes and
parties when a county, in one action, undertook to collect on several
official bonds of a sheriff, covering different terms of office, when the
'" Andrews Music Store, Inc. v. Boone, 197 N. C. 174, 148 S. E. 39 (1929),
relying on Kiger v. Harmon, 113 N. C. 406, 18 S. E. 515 (1893) (a chattel mort-
gage case involving a single defendant), the transaction clause of G. S. 1-123, and
the provisions of G. S. 1-69. Cf. Fields v. Brown, cited supra note 160.
1 211 N. C. 317, 190 S. E. 479 (1937). Cf. McKesson v. Mendenhall, 64 N. C.
502 (1870).
6 7 N. C. Gaw. STAT. (1943) §1-71. See Hanover National Bank v. Cocke,
127 N. C. 467, 37 S. E. 507 (1900), involving several pro rata liability on a single
contract. Held, one cause of action. Cf. cases cited, infra note 173. See also
McLean v. State Bank of McBee, 194 N. C. 797, 139 S. E. 691 (1927), where
plaintiff, alleging he had a contract to buy land, sued to restrain its sale until
claims of mortgagees, judgment creditors and plaintiff were adjudicated. No other
facts given, but joinder was sustained.
... Syme v. Bunting, 86 N. C. 175 (1882). See also Burrell v. Hughes, 116
N. C. 430, 21 S. E. 971 (1895), where principal and sureties were sued on an
official bond for penalties based on several breaches of duty by principal.
..9 Warden v. Andrews, 200 N. C. 330, 156 S. E. 508 (193-1) (misjoinder found
where complaint combined causes for breach of contract with A, with B, and with
a partnership composed of B and C) ; Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 (1887).
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sureties were not the same.170 Similarly, it has been held improper to
join a cause against an administrator and his sureties with one against a
Clerk of Superior Court and his sureties, even though the complaint
alleged facts which, it was contended, showed official misconduct par-
ticipated in by both principals.
17 1
In another case a building contractor sued the owner for the balance
due on the contract. Defendant had the architect brought in and filed
a counterclaim and cross-claim, alleging improper construction by the
plaintiff or defective plans by the architect, or both. This was held to
be an improper attempt to join two causes against different parties.'7 2
However, even when there are separate contracts, joinder may be
proper if there is some feature common to all which makes recovery on
each dependent, to some extent, upon recovery on the others. For ex-
ample, where plaintiff sued five insurance companies on separate fire
policies, the joinder was proper because each policy contained a clause
rendering the insurer liable for a pro rata part of the loss only.
1 73
Pender County v. King, 197 N. C. 50, 147 S. E. 695 (1929). Cf. Syme v.
Bunting, cited supra note 168, holding that principal and same surety may be sued
on bonds covering different terms, and State ex rel. Smith v. The Fidelity and
Deposit Co. of Baltimore, 191 N. C. 643, 132 S. E. 792 (1926), holding that a
single plaintiff may sue a single surety defendant on three separate bonds, the
principals on which (not made parties) were different. See also State v. Gant,
201 N. C. 211, 159 S. E. 427 (1931).
171 Street v. Tuck, 84 N. C. 605 (1881). There is a good argument that the
."connected story" and "common scheme" cases should make the joinder in this
situation permissible. Cf. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 96 N. C. 14, 1 S. E. 648 (1887),
where plaintiff sued: (1) an administrator and his sureties for defalcation; and (2)
the clerk of Superior Court for requiring an insufficient bond of the administrator.
Held, misjoinder of causes and parties. See note 177 infra.
172 Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C. 107, 108 S. E.
389 (1921).
178 Pretzfelder v. Merchants Ins. Co., 116 N. C. 491, 21 S. E. 302 (1895) (the
demurrer was for misjoinder of causes only, but the Court said there was mis-
joinder of neither causes nor parties). See also Planters Savings Bank v. Earley,
204 N. C. 297, 168 S. E. 225 (1933) (in action to assess bank stockholders all
stockholders can be joined as defendants, because an accounting is necessary and
no judgment can be rendered against any stockholder until the amount for which
each is liable is determined). Cf. Virginia Trust Co. v. Pharr Estates, Inc., cited
supra notes 98 and 163 (where separate contracts of guaranty may have been in-
volved) ; Ivy River Land & Timber Co. v. The American Ins. Co., 190 N. C. 801,
130 S. E. 864 (1925) ; Ayers v. Bailey, 162 N. C. 209, 78 S. E. 66 (1913). Another
situation where joinder has been sustained though technically there may be separate
contracts is a suit against successive warrantors in plaintiff's chain of title, for
breach of the same warranty. Winders v. Southerland, cited supra note 12. The
Court said that, though plaintiff could sue them separately, it was the same cause
of action. Cf. Baber v. Hanie, cited supra note 12. Either this principle or that
of Hanover National Bank v. Cocke, supra note 167, would seem to provide an
analogy which would permit joinder where a plaintiff claims contribution from
several defendants who were joint obligors with plaintiff on a debt plaintiff has
been compelled to pay, whether the parties win all co-principals or all co-sureties,
and whether the complaint proceeds on a legal or an equitable theory. See, how-
ever, Petree v. Savage, 171 N. C. 437, 88 S. E. 725 (1916) ; Adams v. Hayes, 120
N..C. 383, 27 S. E. 47 (1897). Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-240. The correct
principle was clearly recognized in Hughes v. Boone, 81 N. C. 204 (1879), where
two plaintiffs sued a single defendant for contribution and joinder was held proper.
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In tort, plaintiff may sue several defendants whose acts combine to
produce a single injury, thus making them joint tort feasors ;174 and he
may also join with the principal defendant one whose liability is predi-
cated solely upon respondeat superior.175 In these cases there is usually
said to be but one cause of action. In one case, the addition of a surety
of one of the defendants did not render the joinder improper,1 76 but
possibly no general rule to that effect can be stated.1
7 7
This was true even though, while there had been a single judgment, different
surety bonds were involved. The Court held that the former equity rules gov-
erning joinder in contribution cases applied, whether the Code action was legal or
equitable. Cf. Bunker v. Llewellyn, 221 N. C. 1, 18 S. E. (2d) 717 (1942).
17 Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N. C. 445, 146 S. E. 79 (1929).
"7 Hough v. Southern Railway, 144 N. C. 692, 57 S. E. 469 (1907).
178 State ex rel. Cook v. Smith, 119 N. C. 350, 25 S. E. 958 (1895). The com-
plaint alleged that defendant sheriff, at the instance of defendant A, who promised
to indemnify the sheriff, wrongfully levied on defendant's property. The surety
on the sheriff's bond was also a defendant. Damages were demanded for the
value of the property sold, for seizure of *an excessive amount of property, and
for deterioration caused by delay in making the sale. The opinion is consistent
with the theory that the action was basically in tort as against both the sheriff and
A (because he procured'the wrongful acts), with the surety being joined as in any
other action based on misfeasance of the sheriff. At one point the opinion indi-
cates there is but one cause of action, but elsewhere deals with joinder of causes
in tort and contract arising from the same transaction. (As for A's joinder, while
the Court seems to give some weight to his indemnity agreement, it is doubtful
that this, standing alone, would justify making him a defendant with the sheriff.
See cases cited supra note 10.) Cf. Strange v. Manning, 99 N. C. 165, 5 S. E. 900
(1888).
17 Even where there is but one principal defendant, the Court may not permit
him and the surety to be joined as defendants if it believes the principal is liable
for some act or some type of damage for which the surety is not liable. In Mar-
tin v. Rexford, 170 N. C. 540, 87 S. E. 352 (1915), it was held that the principal
and surety on his replevy bond could be joined if plaintiff asked only for actual
damages, but that joinder was improper if plaintiff expected to proceed against the
Erincipal on a malicious prosecution theory under which punitive damages might
e allowed, as the surety would not be liable for the latter. Cf. Strange v. Man-
ning, cited supra note 176. See also Railroad Co. v. Hardware Co., 135 N. C. 73,
47 S. E. 234 (1904), where plaintiff sued A for wrongful and malicious attach-
ment, joining B, the surety on A's attachment bond. The Court held this to be mis-
joinder of causes and parties because B's liability on the bond did not include
liability for the injury for which A was sued and, therefore, B was not affected by
the cause against A.
Where two officials are sued for breaches of duty, and their sureties are joined,
the Court is inclined to find a misjoinder. Thus, in State ex rel. Ellis v. Broin,
217 N. C. 787, 9 S. E. (2d) 467 (1940), the sureties of a clerk of Superior Court,
who had paid his defalcation, sued the county accountant, his bondsman, and the
county commissioners, alleging improper auditing of the clerk's office by the
accountant and that the commissioners required insufficient bond and employed
incompetent auditors. The Court sustained the demurrer for misjoinder (as well
as for failure to state a cause of action). The same result was reached in Mitch-
ell v. Mitchell (suit against an administrator, his sureties, and a clerk of Superior
Court) and Street v. Tuck (suit against administrator, clerk of Superior Court,
and sureties of both), both cited supra note 171. The opinions in the first and
third of these cases indicate that, when the sureties are joined, the Court regards
the case as basically one in contract. In the Ellis case the Court said the cause
against the accountant and his sureties sounded in contract, and that against the
commissioners in tort. In the Street case the Court stressed the separate contracts
of the sureties and said that rights against them would remain essentially separate
even though the two officials might become individually responsible for the same
wrongful act committed by both. Despite this strong statement, there would seem
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Where causes based on separate torts are involved, several defend-
ants may still be joined if each is liable for each tort ;178 but again the
requirement that all causes affect all parties operates to shut off joinder
at that point.170 Thus, it was held improper to join a cause against one
defendant for slander with a cause against him and three others for
subsequent publication of the same defamatory matter.'80 This was so
even though plaintiff's attorney did not ask for any separate judgment
on the original slander and contended that he had not alleged a cause
of action on it at all, but had only pleaded it by way of inducement in
connection with the publication by all the defendants. However, assum-
ing that two causes were clearly alleged, the case is as good an illustra-
tion as can be found of the unwisdom of the statutory requirement that
all causes affect all parties.
Where the actions of several defendants, though clearly related in
point of time, are regarded as producing separate injuries instead of a
single injury, the joinder is improper.
l'I
When we switch from multiple defendants to multiple plaintiffs, we
find cases allowing several plaintiffs to join in suing for breach of a
single contract, 82 though this tends to disregard the requirement that
to be no reason why two officials could not be considered joint tort feasors in a
proper case; and if they could be joined as such, State ex rel. Cook v. Smith, cited
supra note 176, should be adequate authority for joining their sureties also, unless
the tort for which a principal is liable is not a breach of the bond. Of course, if
the Court finds that the officials are not joint tort feasors, they could not be joined
and, a fortiori, their sureties could not be. Probably both the Ellis and Mitchell
cases go no further than this-iLe., in them, attempted joinder of the principals
would have been misjoinder even if the sureties had not been sued. Though the
joinder question was not raised, sureties were actually joined with joint tort
feasors in State v. DeHerrodora, 192 N. C. 749, 136 S. E. 6 (1928).
It may be noted that it may be difficult to distinguish between a case like Mar-
tin v. Rexford, supra, holding that the punitive danmage element may cause a mis-
joinder, and the cases, cited supra note 9, holding that it is permissible to join
principal and surety in a suit on an obligation on which both are liable, even
though the surety's liability may, by his contract, be limited to an amount smaller
than the possible recovery against the principal.
178 Howell v. Fuller, 151 N. C. 315, 66 S. E. 131 (1909) (a master and servant
case).
"' Long v. Swindell, 77 N. C. 176 (1877), is a possible exception to this. How-
ever, this feature of the case, while it has been cited once, with possible approval,
Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Peirce, cited supra note 122, has not been fol-
lowed and is probably very questionable authority.
"' Gattis v. Kilgo, 125 N. C. 133 (1899). See also Burns v. Williams, 88 N. C.
159 (1883), where the complaint was grounded on accusations of hog stealing, one
accusation having been made by one defendant in the presence of the others, and
another accusation made by another defendant in the absence of the others. No
objection was made to the joinder, but the Court pointed out it was improper.
Rice v. McAdams, 149 N. C. 29, 62 S. E. 774 (1908) held that defendants cannot
be joined for slanderous words spoken unless they are connected by an allegation
of common design on purpose.
"s" Atkins v. Steed, 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935). See also Bost v. Met-
calf, 219 K'. C. 607, 14 S. E. (2d) 648 (1941).
""sBalfour Quarry Co. v. West Construction Co., 151 N. C. 345, 66 S. E. 217
(1909). The facts were rather unusual. Defendant and plaintiff A made a contract
for delivery of stone by the latter. Plaintiff A "sublet" part of the contract to
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all causes affect all parties when the interests of plaintiffs are several.
Occasionally a case may arise in which the Court would regard the
rights of the plaintiffs, even though arising from a single contract, as so
completely independent as to prevent joinderj'3 Of course, if plaintiffs'
interests are strictly joint, they cannot sue separately 18 4
When separate contracts are involved, plaintiffs ordinarily may not
join, whether the contracts be express, 8 5 or implied.'8s However, in at
least one case, the Court found justification for joinder of suits on
separate contracts, though it is probably dictum.187
plaintiff B. Defendant never formally recognized plaintiff B as a party to the
contract, but told it to ship stone and agreed to the price. Plaintiffs requested
separate recoveries. The Court said if defendant's action made the contract joint,
then each plaintiff -was interested in both causes, while if plaintiff A would alone
be responsible on the contract, the joinder of B was harmless. (Actually if plain-
tiffs' interests were joint, it would seem to show, not that both were interested in
both causes, but that there was a single cause.) The opinion contains a lengthy
discussion of joinder, stressing the "connected story" doctrine and trial conven-
ience. See also Cole v. Shelton, cited supra note 148; Hudson v. Aman, 158 N. C.
429, 74 S. E. 97 (1912) (sureties could join in suing principal, though case, which
discusses former law and equity rules, is short of a holding that this could be
done in all cases); State ex rel. Hoover v. Berryhill, 84 N. C. 133 (1881) (several
next of kin may join in suing administrator's sureties for their respective shares,
which had already been fixed by an accounting). Cf. Brock & Scott Produce Co.
v. Brock, 186 N. C. 54, 118 S. E. 798 (1923). For a somewhat analogous situation,
see Hughes v. Boone, supra note 173, where two plaintiff sureties sued a defendant
surety when plaintiffs had paid a disproportionate share of a single judgment based
on two surety bonds, each plaintiff having been party to only one bond. It is
recognized, however, that the right bf contribution rests on general equitable prin-
ciples rather than on contract.Cf. cases cited infra note 191. ... Cases cited supra note 4.""8 Roberts v. Utility Manufacturing Co., 181 N. C. 204, 106 S. E. 664 (1921);
Logan v. Wallis, cited supra note 169.
v. Kirby, 186 N. C. 387, 119 S. E. 564 (1923); Shore v. Holt, 185
N. C. 312, 117 S. E. 165 (1923). A peculiar situation is presented where, if a
contract is valid, the rights of plaintiffs are joint and they would have to join;
but if the contract is invalid, they must rely individually upon quantum meruit to
recover. In Neal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 224 N. C. 103, 29 S. E. (2d)
206 (1944), plaintiff's counsel correctly decided that. the contract was invalid under
the Statute of Frauds. His course in bringing a separate action for each plaintiff
was sustained. Query, would literal interpretation of the joinder provisions pre-
vent joinder of: (1) joint action to enforce the contract; and (2) quantum meruit
for each plaintiff, to be relied on only if the Court finds the express contract to
be invalid? It is obvious that common sense dictates that such joinder be per-
mitted. See cases cited supra notes 48 through 50.
"" Redmon v. Netherlands Fire Ins. Co., 184 N. C. 481, 114 S. E. 758 (1922).
There A, to secure a loan from B, deeded lumber to C as trustee. C was to sell
lumber, pay off B, and reconvey any lumber then remaining to A. B took out two
fin! insurance policies, covering the lumber, with the same company, one payable to
C and one to A and C as their interests might appear. A assigned his interest to D
as security for another debt. There was a fire and A, B, C and D joined as plain-
tiffs in a suit on both policies. Upon the misjoinder question being raised, plaintiffs
were permitted to allege that B had acquired the interest 'of A and D. The Court
held this eliminated any misjoinder question; but is also said there was no mis-
joinder, anyway. It regarded the plaintiffs as united in interest and the causes as
satisfying the transaction clause; it stressed the identity of the underlying facts;
and even said flatly that D was' interested in the result of both causes because it
was entitled to hold the interest of A in one policy. The result is eminently prac-
tical but, on the point of whether all causes affect all parties,'probably cannot be
squared with the results of some of the other cases where equally practical results
have been rejected.
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In the tort field, the fact that a single tortious act of one defendant
results in injury to several persons does not, standing alone, justify their
joining as plaintiffs.188 This has been carried to the extent of holding
that, when an infant has been injured, it is misjoinder of causes and
parties to unite an action by the infant for personal injuries with one
by the parent for loss of services,'8 9 and the result would apparently
not be changed where the infant's cause is brought in the name of the
parent as next friend. 90 These cases, also, are excellent examples of
the need for the elimination of the requirement that all causes affect
all parties.
There are also several cases indicating that several plaintiffs may
not join in seeking damages for mental anguish caused by the same
wrongful act of one defendant, 191 though in several such cases the
joinder question was inconsequential, as the plaintiffs stated no cause
of action.
Naturally, in the light of the above cases, it is misjoinder for two
plaintiffs to join against one defendant for torts to each separately, not
arising from the same wrongful act.192
When the injury is to property, instead of to the person, the several
plaintiffs may join if each has ati interest in the property. For ex-
ample, the conditional vendor and vendee of a truck were permitted to
join in suing defendant for negligent damage to the truck, even though
... See Walker v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 222 N. C. 607, 24 S. E. (2d) 254
(1943) ; Montgomery v. Blades, 217 N. C. 654, 9 S. E. (2d) 397 (1940).1 8 9 Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N. C. 97, 65 S. E. 750 (1914).
Campbell v. Washington Light and Power Co., 166 N. C. 488, 82 S. E. 842
(1914). The cause of the parent individually was withdrawn and the joinder
problem thus eliminated, but the Court said the action, as originally brought,
seemed to be on all fours with Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, cited supra note
189.
l Cooper v. Southern Express Co., 165 N. C. 538, 81 S. E. 743 (1914) (hus-
band and wife against Express Co. for delay in delivering a coffin, resulting in
burial of child at place not originally intended. Misjoinder waved by failure to
demur, but Court pointed out that it existed) ; Eller v. Railroad, 140 N. C. 140, 52
S. E. 305 (1905) (husband and wife for delay of wedding caused by delay of
railroad in delivering bride's baggage. Misjoinder waived here, also, but Court
pointed it out "so that attention may be called to this important provision of the
law"); Martin v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. C. 299, 41 S. E. 484
(1902) (P's administratrix, P's daughter and daughter's husband sue for delay in
delivery of telegram requesting special doctor for P. Demurrer for misjoinder
of causes. Court said if plaintiffs were suing for P's mental anguish, no cause of
action for that survived P; and if they sued separately for their own mental an-
guish, there was misjoinder of causes and parties). If these three cases are re-
garded as brought primarily on contract theories, they might be considered as in
conflict with the cases cited, supra note 182, allowing two plaintiffs to join in suing
on the same contract. However, there is obviously no ordinary express contract
to which all parties in the case are parties. Further, there is obviously a tort
element in the cases. As to tort and contract theories generally in the public
carrier cases, see McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL
CASES (1929 ed.) §412.
92 Sasser v. Bullard, 199 N. C. 562, 155 S. E. 248 (1930). Husband and wife
attempted to join causes for: (1) assault on both; (2) false arrest, abuse of
process, and false imprisonment of husband. Case dismissed.
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the conditional vendee was asking damages for lost profits, as well.'9
And plaintiffs having an interest in the same real property may likewise
join in a trespass action.19 4 This would clearly not apply where inter-
ests in different property are involved. That is, if there is a three-car
collision, owners A and B may not join in suing owner C for property
damage to their respective cars any more than they could join in suing
him for their respective personal injuries.
Since neither tort causes nor contract causes may be joined unless
they each. affect all parties, the same rule of course applies to attempted
joinder of tort and contract causes.'9 5 (Even if they affect all parties,
contract and tort causes would also have to satisfy the transaction clause
of G. S. 1-123.)
JOINT VERSUS SEVERAL TORTS
It has already been pointed out that the plaintiff may join several
defendants if they are joint tort feasors (i.e., if their concurring acts
produce a single injury), but may not join them if their acts are re-
garded as producing separate injuries.
A troublesome situation in this area is the surprisingly common one
when plaintiff is injured by the non-simultaneous actions of the drivers
of two vehicles. In Atkins v. Steed, 90 plaintiff alleged that he was
knocked from the running board of vehicle A by the negligence of the
driver of vehicle B, and that while he was unconscious on the highway,
as the result of the blow "just previously received," the driver of
vehicle C negligently ran into him. The drivers of vehicles B and C
were made defendants. The trial judge overruled a demurrer for mis-
joinder of causes and parties. The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice
Stacy writing the opinion, reversed and dismissed the case on the theory
that plaintiff was suing for two injuries, not one, and had thus attempted
to join different causes of action against different parties.
There are at least four other cases in which the facts are somewhat
similar. In one the allegation was that plaintiff's intestate was thrown
into the highway by the negligence of defendant A, in whose car she
was riding, and while on the highway was run over by a truck driven
by defendant B and owned by defendant C.19 7 In the second, plaintiff's
intestate was allegedly struck and dragged seventy feet by defendant
... Wilson v. Horton Motor Lines, Inc., 207 N. C. 263, 176 S. E, 750 (1934).
"' Morganton v. Hudson, 207 N. C. 360, 177 S. E. 169 (1934).
... See, e.g., Town of Wilkesboro v. Jordan, 212 N. C. 197, 193 S. E. 155
(1937) (suit by individual plaintiffs against principals and sureties on bond given
in quo zwrranto proceeding, coupled with action by town against principals to
recover town funds wrongfully collected and expended) ; Williams v. Gooch, 206
N. C. 330, 173 S. E. 342 (1934); Martin v. Rexford, and Railroad Co. v. Hard-
ware Co., both cited supra note 177.196 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935).
... Hester v. Horton Motor Lines, 219 N. C. 743, 14 S. E. (2d) 79 4" (1941).
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A's car, and, having then rolled off into the street, was struck by de-
fendant B's car.198 In the third, it was alleged that plaintiff's intestate
was knocked down by defendant A's car and, while attempting to rise,
was struck by defendant B's car. In the remaining case, the com-
plaint alleged that defendant A's street car and defendant B's truck
undertook to pass plaintiff while he was walking between the car track
and the highway; that the street car hit him and knocked him in front
of the truck, which also hit him. 01
In none of these four cases was the joinder question raised. The
last-mentioned of the four is the only one which antedates the Atkins
case, and the Court in the latter distinguished it because of the failure
to raise the objection. But it is clear that in each of the four cases the
Court regarded the defendants as joint tort feasors, liable in damages
for the total injuries suffered; and in one of them,201 it was so held
despite the fact that it was argued there was no evidence of a joint tort.
Conceding that failure to object to the joinder waives that question, it
is difficult to see how it could determine the question of whether the
defendants are joint tort feasors. If their torts are really several, then,
though sued together because misjoinder has been waived, each should
be liable only for the damages attributable to his actions alone.
202
The actions of the several defendants in the street car case were
possibly simultaneous enough to distinguish it, on its facts, from the
running board case; but it is very doubtful if that is true of the other
cases cited. Therefore, the following appraisal of the existing practical
situation seems justified: (1) Defendants would be well advised to raise
the joint versus several tort feasor question by demurrer for misjoinder
of causes and parties ;203 and (2) when this is not done, there is ample
authority for the Court to go the whole way and hold them to be joint
tort feasors.
RULES APPLY TO DEFENDANT'S PLEADINGS
The North Carolina Supreme Court has consistently applied to
counterclaims and cross-claims which, taken together, plead several
causes, the requirement that all causes affect all parties. For example,
in Wingler v. Miller,204 M and W, as administrators, and their sureties,
were being sued by the heirs and distributees, the primary claim being
"I Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937).
""West v. Collins Baking Co, 208 N. C. 526, 181 S. E. 551 (1935)."' Hodgin v. N. C. Public Service Corp., 179 N. C. 449, 102 S. E. 748 (1920).
2' Lewis v. Hunter, cited supra note 198.
'Cf. Long v. Swindell, cited supra note 179.
'0! This question has been raised in this way in other types of tort situations.
See Lineberger v. Gastonia, 196 N. C. 445, 146 S. E. 79 (1929) (defendants owned
separate sewer systems allegedly contributing to plaintiff's injury); Anthony v.
Knight, 211 N. C. 637, 191 S. E. 323 (1937) (motor vehicle collision case). joinder
was held proper in both.
"0'221 N. C. 137, 19 S. E. (2d) 247 (1942).
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that M had taken as his own some money which belonged to the decedent.
M counterclaimed and cross-claimed, alleging: (1) that W had been put
in charge of a business owned in partnership by M and the decedent,
that W was neglecting the business and refused to account; and (2)
that W and the plaintiffs had conspired to defame M by saying that he
had taken money of the estate. On the first cause he asked for an in-
junction, a receiver, and removal of W as administrator; on the second.
he demanded $25,000 damages. This was held to be misjoinder, the
Court pointing out that the defendant sureties had no interest in the
cross-claim and that different causes were alleged against different
parties.P 5
ALTERNATIVE JOINDER
As pointed out in connection with the discussion of joinder of parties,
G. S. 1-68 and 1-69 now permit joinder of plaintiffs or defendants in
the alternative. The permission is clear and express enough wherever
the Court will say there is but one cause of action. For instance, if A
and B are uncertain as to which is the real party in interest, they pre-
sumably could join in the alternative. 206 Or, if A wished to sue the
driver of a truck for negligence, but at the outset he was uncertain
whether B or C was the driver, he could join them as defendants in the
alternative.
But what if several causes of action are thought to be involved?
Will the requirement of G. S. 1-123, that all causes affect all parties,
"05 See, also, as illustrating application of the rules to counterclaims and cross-
claims, Schnepp v. Richardson, 222 N. C. 228, 22 S. E. (2d) 555 (1942) ; Beam
v. Wright, 222 N. C. 174, 22 S. E. (2d) 270 (1942) ; Bost v. Metcalf, 219 N. C.
607, 14 S. E. (2d) 648 (1941) ; Shemwell v. Lethco, 198 N. C. 346. 151 S. E. 729
(1930); Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C. 107, 108
S. E. 389 (1921). Even if a cross-claim involves but a single cause of action, it
will not be permitted unless it is "germane" to the plaintiff's cause. Schnepp v.
Richardson, supra; Montgomery v. Blades, 217 N. C. 654, 9 S. E. (2d) 397
(1940) (where plaintiff sues A and B for negligence, A cannot cross-claim against
B for A's injuries received in the same accident) ; Coulter v. Wilson, 171 N. C.
537, 88 S. E. 857 (1912) ; Gibson v. Barbour, 100 N. C. 192, 6 S. E. 766 (1888) ;
Hulbert v. Douglas, 94 N. C. 128 (1886). In some of the cases this latter rule
and the rule that all causes must affect all parties are apparently regarded as
amounting to the same thing.
Prior to the Montgomery case, in Powell v. Smith, 216 N. C. 242, 4 S. E. (2d)
524 (1939), the Court had held that when plaintiff sued A for negligence and A
had B brought in on allegations that he was a joint tort feasor, B could cross-
claim against A for his injuries received in the same accident The Montgomery
case distinguished this case because there the defendant against whom the cross-
claim was filed was responsible for bringing in the cross-claimant. Since this
factor neither affects trial convenience nor affects the relation of the cross-claim
to plaintiff's cause, the distinction seems of very doubtful validity. Perhaps, under
the circumstances of the Powell case, the Court would hold differently if the ob-
jection came from the plaintiff instead of from the defendant against whom the
cross-claim was filed. (In the Montgomery case, also, the objection came from
the defendant and not the plaintiff.)
" This has apparently been successfully accomplished a few times by simple
joinder of plaintiffs, without making the joinder one expressly in the alternative.
See cases cited supra note 34.
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step in to prevent the alternative joinder? There has been so little at-
tempted use of the alternative joinder provisions in the fifteen years
since their enactment, that the answer is somewhat problematical.
In Grady v. Warren,20 7 the receiver of an insolvent bank sued: (1)
the directors for negligence, prior to the bank's merger with another
bank, resulting in insolvency; and (2) the other bank, for breach of its
contract with the directors of the insolvent bank regarding the liquida-
tion of the assets of the latter. Demurrer for misjoinder of causes and
parties was sustained. There is nothing in the statement of facts to
indicate that the allegations were in the alternative; and it seems prob-
able that the plaintiff could proceed independently on each cause and
recover on both. However, in attempting to sustain joinder, plaintiff's
attorney may have cited the new provision for joinder in the alternative.
At any rate, the Court mentioned it and said it "applies only when the
plaintiff is in doubt as to the persons from whom he is entitled to re-
dress on his cause of action; in that case he may join two or more per-
sons as defendants to determine which is liable. The statute manifestly
does not authorize a misjoinder of causes and of parties. Such was not
its purpose. A complaint is demurrable, now as before the amendment
for a misjoinder of parties, and of causes of action."
2 °8
The new statute pretty clearly didn't apply in the case, but the quoted
language is susceptible of the interpretation that it could never apply
unless there is but a single cause of action.
In Smith v. Greensboro Joint Stock Land Bank,20 D the complaint
alleged that defendant Land Bank foreclosed a mortgage under an in-
sufficient power of sale and also purchased indirectly at its own sale;
and that the land had since been conveyed to others. The bank and the
new holders of legal title were made defendants and plaintiff asked:
(1) to set aside the foreclosure sale and subsequent deeds; or (2), if it
was decided the new owners were innocent purchasers for value, dam-
ages against the Land Bank. Though the Land Bank was involved in
both causes, this is pretty clearly alternative joinder as far as the other
defendants were concerned. The Court found a misjoinder of causes
and parties without mentioning the alternative joinder provisions of
G. S. 1-69. The reasons given were that the causes proceeded on incon-
sistent theories and that all causes did not affect all parties.
However, in Pietznan v. Town of Zebulon,2 0 the Court permitted
use of the alternative joinder statute. Plaintiff sued the town for breach
of contract. The town answered, alleging that the Mayor and Clerk,
who made the contract on behalf of the town, did not have authority
207201 N. C. 693, 161 S. E. 319 (1931).
08 201 N. C. 693, 694, 161 S. E. 319, 320 (1931).
209213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481 (1938).
210219 N. C. 473, 14 S. E. (2d) 416 (1941).
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to do so. Plaintiff then had the Mayor and Clerk made parties defend-
ant and amended to allege: (1) the town was liable on the contract; or
(2) the other defendants were liable for wrongfully making the contract
and inducing the plaintiff to enter into an unauthorized contract. In
sustaining joinder the Court reasoned: (a) the complaint told a "con-
nected story"; (b) tort and contract causes could be joined under the
transaction clause of G. S. 1-123; (c) no alternative facts were alleged,
the only alternative being which defendants were liable; and (d) since
plaintiff was in doubt as to who was liable, the statute applied. While
it appears that defendant's attorney argued that the joinder was im-
proper because the two causes did not each affect all parties, the Court
did not expressly deal with the statutory provision to that effect.
Since the opinion dealt with the case as presenting two causes of
action, it seems definitely to negative the implication in the Grady case
that the alternative joinder statute can apply only where there is one
cause of action. It leaves, however, some doubt as to whether the Court
will permit joinder of two causes, involving different defendants, if
alternative factual allegations are involved, as well as doubt as to its
effect on the doctrine of the Smith case.
A brief examination of the cases antedating the 1931 change in the
statute does not throw much additional light on the future of that
provision.
In one case the Court refused to allow the owner of a building to
claim damages against the contractor and architect on allegations that
the building was not properly constructed by the contractor or the archi-
tect's plans and specifications were defective, or both. 211  (There was
no privity of contract between contractor and architect.) Would the
Peitzman case change the result of this case? It seems doubtful because:
(1) to the extent that an alternative is presented the Court might re-
gard it as dependent upon alternative facts; and (2) the allegations
seem to contemplate the possibility of recovery against both defendants,
thus not presenting a case in which plaintiff anticipates recovery against
only one but is uncertain as to which it will be. The latter feature
eliminates an argument that can be made in a situation like that of the
Peitzman case-i.e., that both causes affect all parties, in a practical
sense, because if plaintiff is held entitled to recover on one it automati-
cally eliminates the possibility of recovery on the other. The two are
mutually exclusive.
There has been a time, however, when such mutual exclusiveness
was a stumbling block rather than an aid to joinder. In Huggins v.
Waters,212 plaintiff alleged that he leased a hotel from W and that B
'11 Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., cited spra note 205.
212 154 N. C. 443, 70 S. E. 842 (1911).
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obstructed the private drain through which the hotel's. sewage was dis-
charged. He sued W for breach of the implied covenant of quiet en-
joyment iand B for damages for the wrongful obstruction. The Court
said the two causes were destructive of one another, because if B's act
was wrongful there was no breach of the covenant by W, while if it was
rightful W would be liable and B would not be. Should this situation
be again presented, the Peitzman case ought to be authority for suing
W and B in the alternative. It seems to involve no more of a factual
alternative than the J'eitzman case; there is doubt as to which defendant
may be liable, but no possibility of recovery against both; and because
of the mutual exclusiveness, both defendants are affected by both causes
to the same extent as in the Peitzman case. Further, while the Court
in the Huggins case said that the plaintiff should elect against which
defendant to proceed, it afterward held that he could bring independent
actions against each of them, 213 and so there did not have to be a final
and binding election in the true election of remedies sense. There seems
to be no sound reason why the whole matter could not now be disposed
of in one action.
There are several relatively early Code cases in which the Court
believed that the pre-Code equity practice justified what amounted to
alternative joinder. Thus, in Heggie v. Hill,214 it permitted plaintiff
in one action, to sue: (1) the owners of record title to land, derived
through foreclosure of a mortgage, for possession of the land; and (2)
the mortgagee who foreclosed, for the excess of the purchase price over
the amount of the debt secured. Obviously, plaintiff would not be en-
titled to both. Success on his first theory depended on his contention
that the foreclosure was wrongful, based on his allegations that nothing
was due on the debt at the time of foreclosure. His second theory
rested on alternative allegations that only $177 was due on the debt at
the time of foreclosure, whereas the sale realized $1,066. Under this
theory, since some of the debt would have remained unpaid at fore-
closure, the latter would be rightful. The Court held the joinder proper
since the rights of all the parties depended upon whether the mortgage
had been satisfied. Two things are worth noting: (a) alternative factual
allegations were involved; and (b) one theory proceeded on disaffirm-
ance of the sale and the other on its affirmance.
• 8Huggins v. Waters. 167 N. C. 197, 83 S. E. 334 (1914).
95 N. C. 306 (1886). The Court said, among other things, that all prior
authority authorized the joinder. Whether this was so is somewhat problematical
in the light of Browns v. Coble, 76 N. C. 391 (1877). There plaintiff sued to
recover possession from the occupant, asking cancellation of a deed given by a
clerk and master, through which the occupant claimed title. In the alternative,
plaintiff asked for judgment for the purchase money against the administrator of
the clerk and master. At the trial the issue of possession was decided for the
occupant. On appeal this was affirmed and the action against the administrator
dismissed, the Court saying that as to the possession issue he had no interest, and
as to the purchase money issue, the occupant had no interest.
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As to the first of these, the language of the Peitznan case leaves
the authority of the case open to doubt. As to the second, numerous
North Carolina cases have held that a plaintiff may not proceed on two
such conflicting theories 2 15 The case was, therefore, very doubtful
authority on this point until its rule was possibly revived by the decision
in the Peitzman case, which also involved theories of affirmance and
disaflirmance.
In Young v. Young,216 the plaintiff's basic allegations were that his
ancestor had paid for land but died before getting his conveyance, and
that defendants had conspired to cheat and defraud by withholding the
title. He demanded: (1) judgment that Z, the record owner, be ordered
to convey to plaintiff, and for damages against him; and (2) judgment
against Z and three others, one of whom received the purchase money,
for the amount of the purchase price. The Court upheld the joinder,
though it found the action barred, pro tanto, by the statute of frauds.
This seems, on the su~rface, to present an alternative joinder situation,
but it is possible that all defendants could be regarded as joined for
purposes of both causes. However, assuming the former, the authority
of the case is probably less doubtful than that of the Heggie case, as it
can be construed as standing for the proposition that when plaintiff can-
not recover on an alleged express contract, he may still be entitled to
some recovery on an implied contract theory. The joinder of the two
is still clearly permitted, at least at the pleading stage,2 17 and the only
unusual feature of the case then becomes the possible alternative party
feature. The present alternative joinder provisions may well be broad
enough to permit that feature of the case to be now followed.
The result of the Peitznman case is thoroughly commendable; but can
it be relied upon, standing alone, to support the conclusion that neither
notions about inconsistent causes nor the doctrine of election of remedies
will be applied where the parties are sued in the alternative? Where
the so-called inconsistency arises simply from joining tort and contract
theories (i.e., fraud or negligence and breach of warranty)2 18 or from
joining express and implied contract theories,2 19 where no alternative
party question is presented, it is clear that joinder at the pleading stage
is proper and the only real question is whether an election can be forced
at the trial. It will probably be only very rarely that this sort of case
will involve alternative joinder of parties. Even if the Young case be
regarded as such a case, its facts will not often be duplicated. But,
assuming such a case will arise, it would seem to be squarely within the
See cases cited supra note 51. 218 81 N. C. 92 (1879).
2 See cases cited supra notes 48 to 50, inclusive.
2 8 See discussion under "Joinder of Causes" and cases cited supra notes 46
and 47.
I" See cases cited supra notes 48 to 50, inclusive.
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language of G. S. 1-69 and within the ruling in the Peitzman case. It
would be anomalous if an election could be forced when there is but
one defendant and not when there are alternative defendants; but the
probable answer is that no election should be forced in any case. At
the close of the evidence both theories should go to the jury under proper
instructions, unless there is insufficient evidence to justify recovery on
one theory or the other.
However, the doctrine of election of remedies is a more serious
matter, since it can go to the point of barring any recovery on the sec-
ond theory after an attempt to proceed on the first. It is not possible
in this article to engage in any thorough discussion of this doctrine,
but it can be said that it has found its main application in the notion
that a plaintiff may not proceed on theories which involve both affirm-
ance and disaffirmance of a contract or sale.220 It operates even where
there is only one defendant. As already indicated, the Peitzman case
involved theories of both affirmance and disaffirmance, but this feature
received no attention from the Court. By contrast, in the Smith case,22'
decided after the alternative joinder statute was enacted, the presence
of inconsistent theories was a major factor in rejecting the joinder.
This was true though they were not theories of affirmance and disaffirm-
ance, but only what the Court regarded as inconsistent theories of
disaffirmance.
It seems to the writer that the Smith and Peitzman cases, though
their facts are not the same, reach irreconcilable results. Thus we have
a situation, not altogether uncommon in North Carolina, where the
Court is apparently at liberty to follow either case. The one stresses
inconsistency, without mentioning alternative joinder; the other stresses
alternative joinder, without mentioning inconsistency. For the time
being, the Peitzmaan case, being the later of the two, should be taken as
controlling. And it is to be hoped that it will be followed, as otherwise
a large part of the field intended to be covered by the alternative joinder
provisions will be withdrawn from their coverage. At the same time, if
the Court does not modify its basic notions about election of remedies,
we will have a situation in which plaintiff may join defendants in the
alternative on two theories which he could not plead against the same
defendant. But any relief from the election doctrine is welcome; and
if realization of this anomaly, coming in the wake of the Peitznan case,
leads to modification of the election doctrine in the single defendant
cases, the Peitzman case will have given double cause for rejoicing.
220 See cases cited supra note 51. It may be noted here that joinder of express
and implied contract theories may, in one sense, involve theories of affirmance and
disaffirmance. However, the election of remedies doctrine does not seem to have
been applied by the North Carolina Court to ordinary express versus implied
contract cases.
2. See note 209 supra.
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Perhaps, also, for purposes of the alternative joinder cases, the
spectre of the requirement that all causes affect all parties has not been
completely laid. As already indicated, the Court in the Peitznman case
rejected an argument based on this provision, but did not expressly cite
it. Also, as already pointed out, it seems sound to say that in a Peitz-
inan case situation, all causes do affect all parties because recovery on
either will bar recovery on the other. The controlling issue in each
cause is the same. However, this reasoning would apply almost equally
well to the facts of the Smith case, and there the Court said that all
causes did not affect all parties. Again it is to be hoped that, if the
question is not settled by eliminating this troublesome provision from
G. S. 1-123, the Peitznun case will be followed. And finally, it is to be
hoped that the Court will not follow the implication in the Peitznan
case that alternative factual allegations might destroy the propriety of
the joinder.
CONSEQUENCES OF MISJOINDER OF CAUSES AND PARTIES
Improper joinder of causes and parties is not specifically listed as a
ground for demurrer by G. S. 1-127. However, since improper joinder
of causes alone is so listed, it is clear that demurrer is the proper method
of raising the "dual misjoinder" objection when it appears on the face
of the complaint, and failure to demur will waive it.222
If several defendants demur jointly, instead of individually, for mis-
joinder of causes and parties, the 'demurrer should be overruled if any
one of the demurring defendants is a necessary or proper party to all
the causes.
2m
When the objection is properly presented and is sustained, it results
in dismissal of the entire action, without prejudice to the right to begin
"" Ezzell v. Merritt, 224 N. C. 602, 31 S. E. (2d) 751 (1944) ; Goldsboro v.
W. P. Rose Builders Supply Co., 200 N. C. 405, 157 S. E. 58 (1931) ; Godwin v.
Jernigan, 174 N. C. 76, 93 S. E. 443 (1917); Cooper v. Southern Express Co.,
165 N. C. 538, 81 S. E. 743 (1914) ; Weeks v. McPhail, 128 N. C. 134, 38 S. E.
292 (1901) ; Hocutt v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 124 N. C. 214, 32 S. E. 681
(1899). See also Rogers v. Rogers, 192 N. C. 50, 133 S. E. 184 (1926). The
Court sometimes calls attention to misjoinder, even though it does not dismiss
because of the waiver. See, e.g., Walker, J., in Eller v. Railroad, 140 N. C. 140,
145, 52 S. E. 305, 307 (1905) : "If plaintiffs had any valid cause of action against
defendant, they could not join them.... There was no formal objection taken
to the misjoinder, but we notice it so that attention may be called to this impor-
tant provision of the law which is mandatory, and intended to protect a substantial
right of defendant, and not merely directory."
"" Moore County v. Burns, 224 N. C. 700, 32 S. E. (2d) 225 (1944). The
ruling is based on prior rulings that a joint demurrer for failure to state a cause
of action is to be overruled if a cause is stated as to any demurring defendant.
State ex rel. Salisbury Morris Plan Co. v. McCanless, 193 N. C. 200, 136 S. E.
371 (1927) ; Winders v. Southerland, 174 N. C. 235, 93 S. E. 726 (1917). Appar-
ently the effect of this latter rule can be avoided by interposing an individual de-
murrer ore tenus when the question is raised. Blackman v. Winders, 144 N. C.
212, 56 S. E. 874 (1907). However, this would not provide an out in the mis-
joinder cases, as misjoinder is not a proper ground for demurrer ore tenus.
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separate actions.224 The same rule applies to cross-actions involving the
"dual misjoinder," though where the misjoinder arises by virtue of a
combination of cross-action against a co-defendant and counterclaim
against the plaintiff, the latter will remain in the case if it, standing
alone, is a permissible counterclaim. 225
The rule has not always been strictly enforced. In one early case
the Supreme Court gave plaintiff an opportunity to amend, without
menticning dismissal.m22 In another, while enunciating the dismissal
rule, it remanded the case with opportunity to the plaintiff to apply for
leave to amend.2 27  In a third, the case was remanded for the exercise
of the lower court's discretion in severing or otherwise disposing of the
action.228
One later case seems to be an outright exception, as the Court dis-
approved a dismissal and remanded the case with instructions that the
lower court could permit an amendment, in its discretion, and that,
in the absence of an amendment, it would be the duty of the lower court
to divide the action. 220 And another, comparatively recent case seems
also to be an exception, as the Court seems to have dismissed only as to
2" Moore County v. Burns, cited supra: note 223; Summit Mills, Inc. v. Summit
Yarn Co., 223 N. C. 479, 27 S. E. (2d) 289 (1943) ; Burleson v. Burleson, 217 N.
C. 336, 7 S. E. (2d) 706 (1940); Atkins v. Steed, 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889
(1935) ; Lucas v. N. C. Bank and Trust Co., 206 N. C. 909, 174 S. E. 301 (1934) ;
Sasser v. Bullard, 199 N. C. 562, 155 S. E. 248 (1930) ; State ex rel. Cromartie v.
Parker, 121 N. C. 198, 28 S. E. 297 (1897). This is not intended to be a complete
list of cases announcing the rule. The provisions of N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943)
§1-25 apply to the new actions. Blades v. Southern Railway Co., 218 N. C. 702, 12
S. E. (2d) 553 (1940).
It has been held that when the demurrer is sustained for misjoinder of causes
and parties, the plaintiff cannot thereafter apply for leave to amend under G. S.
1-131, as, in effect, the action has already been dismissed, is no longer pending,
and the Court has no jurisdiction to permit the amendment. Grady v. Warren,
202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
"'Wingler v. Miller, 221 N. C. 137, 19 S. E. (2d) 247 (1942) ; Rose v. Fre-
mont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C 107, 108 S. E. 389 (1921).
"5 Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 (1877). The opinion clearly indicated what
the amendment should do--eliminate one of five causes alleged.
237 Mitchell v. Mitchell, 96 N. C. 14, 1 S. E. 648 (1887). See also Wooten v.
Maultsby, 69 N. C. 462 (1872), where it appears the Court might have permitted
an amendment except for the fact that, after amendment, the service of process
could have been set aside as irregular and so the amendment would have served
no purpose. Contrast Grady v. Warren, cited supra note 224.
228 Street v. Tuck, 84 N. C. 605 (1881). The demurrer was for misjoinder of
causes, and the "dual misjoinder" question may not have been properly raised; but
the Court discussed it in terms of misjoinder of both causes and parties and said
nothing about waiver.
2' Gattis v. Kilgo, 125 N. C. 133, 34 S. E. 246 (1899). Here the demurrer
was for misjoinder of separate causes affecting different defendants, and was
accompanied by a motion to dismiss. Compare Martin v. Rexford, 170 N. C. 540,
87 S. E. 352 (1915), where the Court was not sure whether plaintiff intended to
sue on two theories, joinder of which would be improper. It overruled the de-
mdrrer and said that if plaintiff really intended to do so, the action should be
divided. See also Benton v. Board of Education, 201 N. C. 653, 161 S. E. 96
(1931).
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the defendants whose presence was thought to cause the misjoinder, re-
taining the other demurring defendants.
230
However, there is no serious question about the fact that dismissal
is the basic rule; though if -the defendants direct their demurrer at only
one of several causes, dismissal of it alone may be the result,23 ' and if
but one of several defendants demurs for the misjoinder, the case may
be dismissed only as to him
23 2
Possibly the most serious criticism to be directed against the Court
in the joinder field is its adoption of this dismissal rule (though it is of
sufficient antiquity to prevent its being laid on the doorstep of the pres-
ent personnel of the Court). There are, as pointed out from time to
time in this article, cases denying joinder which seem overly technical;
but in most of them the Court has been struggling to interpret statutes
which clearly do contain restrictions on joinder. And to counterbalance
them the Court has often, as in the creditors' bill cases, made very liberal
decisions. But there is no statute which requires the dismissal for "dual,
misjoinder," and there is a good argument that the rule should never
have been adopted.
As already stated, misjoinder of parties alone-as distinguished
from a defect of parties (i.e., failure to join a necessary party)-is not
a ground for demurrer. Misjoinder of causes is ground for demurrer,
but by the express provisions of G. S. 1-132, the penalty is not dis-
missal, but only division of the action. It is a little difficult to see how
a combination of these relatively innocuous errors requires dismissal.
Why not follow the statutory procedure prescribed for the only one
specifically listed as ground for demurrer and divide the action? There
is not a very satisfactory answer to this question in the cases, most of
which, particularly the later ones, simply recognize and enforce the rule
on the basis of earlier decisions.
In the relatively early case of Mitchell v. Mitchell,2 3 the Court said
that the power to divide given by G. S. 1-132 (then Code Section 272)
did not extend to misjoinder of both parties and causes. "In the latter
"' Robertson v. Robertson, 215 N. C. 562, 2 S. E. (2d) 552 (1939). See also
Shore v. Holt, 185 N. C. 312, 117 S. E. 165 (1923), where husband and wife °
joined as plaintiffs, each seeking to recover in quantum meruit for services ren- .;
dered. The Court said the husband's allegations should be stricken out, but al-
lowed the wife's action to continue because the husband could then properly remain
as a purely formal party. However, the Court has dismissed in husband and wife
cases. See Sasser v. Bullard, cited supra note 224. The Court said this was not
at variance with Shore v. Holt, but did not say why.
"' Hollard v. Whittington, 215 N. C. 330, 1 S. E. (2d) 813 (1939). Though
directed only to the second cause of action, the demurrer specifically relied, inter
alia, on misjoinder of causes and parties. The lower court dismissed the second
cause and the Supreme Court, on plaintiff's appeal, affirmed, expressly finding that
there was such misjoinder.
' Carswell v. Whisenant, 203 N. C. 674, 166 S. E. 793 (1932). The basic
facts are not given in the report, but the result is stated as given in the text.
"' Cited supra note 227.
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case, it would seldom be practicable to divide the action. The statute
has not provided that it may be done." 23
4
As to the point that the statute does not authorize division, it may
equally be said that the statute does not expressly prevent it. And, even
at the time this case was decided, Code Section 407 (now G. S. 1-179)
provided: "A separate trial between a plaintiff and any of several de-
fendants may be allowed by the Court when, in its opinion, justice will
-thereby be promoted." The two sections together would seem to indi-
cate -that the legislature had no policy requiring dismissal where the
presence of multiple defendants might cause confusion, even though the
separate trial provision may be strictly construed as applying only to a
case in which there is no misjoinder. The same thing can now be said
as to multiple plaintiffs, since G. S. 1-68 now provides: "If, upon the
application of any party, it shall appear that such joinder may embarrass
or delay the trial, the Court may order separate trials or make such other
order as may be expedient."
As to the second ground of the Mitchell decision-that division
would seldom be practicable-the Court's action in the case itself seems
to belie it. The-plaintiff there, contrary to the rule followed in most
of the subsequent cases, was given opportunity to apply for leave to
amend. 235 This, in effect, allows the plaintiff to eliminate the objection-
able features and include them, if he so desires, in another action, while
retaining the remainder of the original action. If it is practicable for
the plaintiff thus to divide the action, is it not equally practicable for
the Court to do so by ordinary division? If the Court can decide what
creates the misjoinder, can it not also see how the division may be
made ?
Several cases further illustrate that division would ordinarily be
perfectly practicable. It has been held that voluntary elimination of
one cause of action, when the misjoinder objection is made, will pre-
vent dismissal of the remainder (assuming, of course, that what remains
presents no misjoinder). This is true whether the offer is to eliminate
an objectionable cause without any change in parties,2 6 or to drop a
party.237 Whether the offer is to take a voluntary nonsuit or takes
28,96 N. C. 14, 18, 1 S. E. 648, 650 (1887).
8. Compare Douglas, J., in State ex tel. Cromartie v. Parker, 121 N. C. 198,
204, 28 S. E. 297 (1897) : "As this action cannot be maintained as now constituted,
and cannot be divided, we do not see how the plaintiff could be benefited by leave
to amend, even if granted." Since the Mitchell case was cited, the Court seem-
ingly was expressing disapproval of the amendment privilege there granted.
238 Walker v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 222 N. C. 607, 24 S. E. (2d)
254 (1943). One cause of action, affecting plaintiff husband alone, was eliminated,
leaving causes in which both plaintiff husband and plaintiff wife had an interest.
It seems, however, that the offer must be made before decision sustaining the
demurrer, and cannot be successfully interposed by way of motion to amend after
such decision. Grady v. Warren, cited supra note 224.
", Campbell v. Washington Light and Power Co., 166 N. C. 488, 82 S. E. 842
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some other form seems to make little difference, so long as the basic
intention is clear
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It is quite true, as the Court has pointed out,23 9 that these devices
are not a division within the meaning of the statute. But they plainly
illustrate the fact that it is practicable, and relatively simple, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, to decide what must come out of the
action to avoid the misjoinder objection. No more knowledge or trouble
would be needed to effect a division.
But, be that as it may, the dismissal rule abides as a sort of punish-
ment for making an error which the Court regards as double instead of
single.
CONSOLIDATION
By use of the consolidation device, two causes of action which must,
under the statutes, be brought independently may be tried together. For
example, A and B, riding in the same car and injured in the same acci-
dent, may not join as plaintiffs; but their separate actions may be con-
solidated for trial even over the objection of the defendant.240 And not
infrequently, in recent years, such cases have been consolidated by
mutual consent.
241
(1914) (plaintiff parent, suing individually and as next friend of infant son for
loss of services and personal injuries, respectively, permitted to withdraw as indi-
vidual) ; Syme v. Bunting, 86 N. C. 175 (1882) (plaintiff -originally sued clerk of
Superior Court and his sureties, A and B; he was permitted to amend to add an-
other cause on a bond for a different term, dropping B as a party because B, unlike
4, was -not a surety on the bond involved in the new cause). Cf. Price v. Char-
lotte Electric Railway Co., 160 N. C. 450, 76 S. E. 502 (1912) (one plaintiff could
renounce claim for damages, but joinder was not the issue).
... Thus, in Walker v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, cited supra note 236,
it took the form of an offer by plaintiffs to agree that the court might strike out
one cause, which the Supreme Court said was tantamount to taking a nonsuit on
that cause. The Court permitted this to avert dismissal, though its information
about the offer apparently came from plaintiff's brief rather than the record. In
Campbell v. Washington Light and Power Co., cited supra note 237, one plaintiff
was permitted to withdraw, though the Court said this was not, in a strict sense,
a nonsuit. In Weeks v. McPhail, 128 N. C. 134, 38 S. E. 292 (1901), the Court
pointed out that historically, when plaintiff declined to proceed on one or more
causes or as to one or more defendants, leaving the case pending as to others, it
was technically a nolle prosequi rather than a nonsuit. However, the Court said
there was no longer any substantial difference between the two in this respect and
nonsuit could be used in either situation. On this question, see also Gatewood v.
Leak, 99 N. C. 363, 6 S. E. 706 (1888) ; Wooten v. Maultsby, cited supra note 227.
"" Campbell v. Washington Light and Power Co., cited supra note 237.
... Robinson v. Standard Transportation Co., 214 N. C. 489, 199 S. E. 725
(1938). For examples of other types of cases in which consolidation has been
employed, see: Abbitt v. Gregory, 201 N. C. 577, 160 S. E. 896 (1931) (several
stockholders suing for damages because agent effecting sale of their stock withheld
information as to price actually paid by vendee) ; Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Southern Railway Co., 179 N. C. 255, 102 S. E. 417 (1920) (several insurance
companies suing to recover amounts paid on same fire loss); Williams v. Carolina
and Northwestern Railroad Co., 144 N. C. 498, 57 S. E. 216 (1907) (several per-
sons suing for failure of train to stop at station) ; Rollins v. Rollins, 76 N. C. 264
(1877) (several ejectment actions involving same issue of title). See McINTosH,
NORTH CAROLINA PAcrTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1929 ed.) §§506, 507.
2,1 See, e.g., Toler v. Savage, 226 N. C. 208, 37 S. E. (2d) 485 (1946) ; Wal-
1946]
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When the joinder and the consolidation cases are put together, they
mean, in theory, that A and B might join as plaintiffs and, upon de-
murrer, their action would be dismissed; that they then start over inde-
pendently and, over defendant's objection, the cases can be consolidated
for trial.
The consolidation cases show conclusively that in many situations
in which our statutes will not permit joinder, the statutory prohibition
is not based on any sound principle of trial convenience. At the same
time they offer some measure of relief from the statutory restrictions.
However, consolidation is not an effective substitute for free joinder
privileges, because: (1) It accomplishes nothing toward minimizing
costs in cases settled prior to trial. (2) When consolidation is had in
cases in which joinder would not have been permitted over objection,
some of the cases have required separate appeals.24 2 (3) Since trial con-
venience will point toward one trial instead of several more often than
not, the sounder policy is to authorize joinder, with separate trials
granted when justice demands, rather than to deny joinder, with con-
solidation permitted.
SUMMARY
Except for the dismissal rule, the record of the North Carolina
Supreme Court in interpreting the joinder statutes shows more cases
resulting in liberal than in literal construction. But the statutes them-
selves, which have undergone no major revision since the Code was
adopted, are unduly restrictive. It is time to remove some of the
stumbling blocks which they interpose to free joinder. Modernization
of joinder rules has been going on elsewhere, and has culminated in the
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These furnish an
excellent model for revision of the North Carolina statutes. The changes
which would be necessary to conform the State practice to Federal, and
the reasons why they are advisable, will be the subject of a subsequent
article.
lace v. Longest, 226 N. C. 161, 37 S. E. (2d) 112 (1946); Strickland v. Smith,
226 N. C. 517, 39 S E. (2d) 381 (1946) ; Kennedy v. Smith, 226 N. C. 514, 39
S. E. (2d) 380 1(1946). These last-mentioned two cases are reported separately,
but the opinion in the Strickland case states that they were tried together. They
illustrate that trial convenience does not require that the issues be identical, because
it affirmatively appears that evidence of contributory negligence caused a reversal
of a verdict for plaintiff in one case and not in the other. See, however, Robinson
v. Standard Transportation Co., cited supra note 240, stating that consolidation
may be ordered when the causes grow out of the same transaction and the defense
is the same. 'See also Butner v. Spease, 217 N. C. 82, 6 S. E. (2d) 808 (1940).
"2'Osborn. v. Town of Canton, 219 N. C. 139, 13 S. E. (2d) 265 (1941) ; Wil-
liams v. Carolina and Northwestern Railroad Co., cited supra note 240. Conley v.
Pearce-Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C. 211, 29 S. E. (2d) 740 (1944), is contra, but
does not cite the prior cases.
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